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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the last financial crisis, what should the Federal Reserve 
(the Fed) have done when lenders stopped making loans, even to bor-
rowers with sterling credit and strong collateral?1 Because the central 
bank is the last resort for funding, the conventional answer had been to 
lend freely at a penalty rate against good collateral, as Walter Bagehot 
suggested in 1873 about the Bank of England.2 Acting thus as a lender of 
last resort, the central bank will keep solvent banks liquid but let insol-
vent banks go out of business, as they should. The Fed tried this, but 
when the conventional wisdom did not work, it provided liquidity to new 
products and firms using authority enacted during the Great Depression 
to deal with financial emergencies—section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve 
Act (the Act).3 
It worked, but it came at a price—the Fed lost legitimacy in the 
eyes of many.4 The new emergency-liquidity programs, however, were 
needed to make Bagehot’s rule relevant in a credit market where deposit-
funded loans now compete with credit-risk products originated by both 
banks and nonbanks,5 and where these products are traded actively. Once 
                                                     
 1. Christian A. Johnson, Exigent and Unusual Circumstances: The Federal Reserve and the 
U.S. Financial Cycle, EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 28 (forthcoming) (“There is an enormous amount of 
assessment and analysis that needs to be done both with respect to the actions of the Fed during the 
financial crisis and the apparent expansion of its mission.”). 
 2. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET (1873). 
 3. This was the text of section 13(3) at the time of the crisis: 
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any Federal 
reserve bank, during such periods as the said board may determine, at rates established in 
accordance with the provisions of section 357 of this title, to discount for any individual, 
partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes, drafts, 
and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal 
Reserve bank: Provided, That before discounting any such note, draft, or bill of exchange 
for an individual or a partnership or corporation, the Federal reserve bank shall obtain ev-
idence that such individual, partnership, or corporation is unable to secure adequate credit 
accommodations from other banking institutions. All such discounts for individuals, part-
nerships, or corporations shall be subject to such limitations, restrictions, and regulations 
as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may prescribe. 
12 U.S.C. § 343(a) (1991). 
 4. “An election year posse is being formed in Washington to try to round up the perpetrators of 
the Great Recession.” Massimo Calabresi & Bill Saporito, The Street Fighter, TIME, Feb. 13, 2012, 
at 22–27 (covering Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for S.D.N.Y.); see also Adam J. Levitin, In Defense 
of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 437 (2011) (“The government’s handling of the crisis provided wide-
spread dissatisfaction because of its haphazardness, because of its lack of transparency, and because 
of the use of taxpayer dollars.”). 
 5. A minority of voices—none from the legal community—have strongly supported the Fed’s 
emergency-liquidity efforts. PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED 
BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT 115 (Princeton Univ. Press 2011); R. Glenn Hubbard, Hal 
Scott & John Thornton, The Fed Can Lead on Financial Supervision, WALL ST. J., July 25–26, 
2009, at A13 (criticizing Fed bashing and proposals to reduce its independence); Alex J. Pollock, 
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credit becomes a tradable commodity, you need “market makers” to 
make the trading go smoothly.6 This dynamic is apparent in the market 
for U.S. Treasury debt. Uncertain about the rate that the Treasury will 
have to pay, it announces its borrowing needs and holds an auction.7 The 
Treasury wants to ensure enough demand for its debt.8 
Enter the “primary dealers”—firms that have promised to buy part 
of each new debt issue that the Treasury auctions.9 These nonbank firms 
are market makers in the primary market (where an instrument is first 
issued) because they promise to “take down” some of each auction’s 
debt, boosting the debt’s initial value by adding demand for the new is-
                                                                                                   
Fed Stretches Elastic Currency Mandate, AM. BANKER, Dec. 12, 2011, at 8 (arguing that Fed’s 
efforts were justified based on its mandate to build an “elastic” currency); William H. Buiter & Anne 
C. Sibert, The Central Bank as Market Maker of Last Resort 1, FIN. TIMES BLOG (Aug. 12, 2007), 
http://maverecon.blogspot.com/2007/08/central-bank-as-market-maker-of-last.html. 
 6. This Article builds on a central insight from my decade as a market regulator: price discov-
ery for financial products takes place against a background of enormous public, private, and mixed 
coordination that is usefully understood as “market making.” This is especially true now that the 
credit market has been securitized. I saw this at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, where 
I worked on the dealer and trading activities of national banks. Working for two apex issuers of 
public debt securities—the World Bank and the U.S. Treasury—showed me how the borrowing 
needs of massive issuers like these could, effectively, drive market structure, including by creating 
new products. For example, the World Bank is credited with having pioneered the large-scale swap 
in 1981 to meet a foreign exchange need. Bruce S. Darringer, Swaps, Banks, and Capital: An Analy-
sis of Swap Risks and A Critical Assessment of the Basle Accord’s Treatment of Swaps, 16 U. PA. J. 
INT’L BUS. L. 259, 273 (1995); see also Kenneth D. Garbade, Why the U.S. Treasury Began Auction-
ing Treasury Bills in 1929, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., July 2008. While at the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (Commission), I inspected the specialist function at the New York Stock 
Exchange (a self-regulatory organization), learning about market makers’ affirmative and negative 
duties and seeing how exchanges could administratively redetermine certain price outcomes deemed 
inconsistent with a specialist’s stabilization duties. At the Commission, I also participated in inter-
agency surveillance of the repurchase market for primary dealers, my first contact with the collateral 
markets that became prominent during the last crash. Conventional notions of “market regulation” 
often address consumer protection and fraud, but not enough attention is paid to the varieties of 
market making that influence price. This is a crucial issue in an era like ours, in which the border 
between the state and the market is under review. For a good recent survey of the policy issues in-
volved in public control over the economy, see generally VITO TANZI, GOVERNMENT VERSUS 
MARKETS: THE CHANGING ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE STATE (2011). 
 7. For an example of how the refunding process works, see Most Recent Quarterly Refunding 
Documents, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-
center/quarterly-refunding/Pages/Latest.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). Before the auction, the 
Treasury estimated that they would need about $182 billion in debt to pay for maturing debt and for 
new expenses. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Treasury Announces Marketable Borrowing 
Estimates (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ 
tg1556.aspx. 
 8. Demand has fallen short at least twice. In March 1920, the Treasury’s attempt to raise $300–
350 million netted only $200 million, and in December 1922 an attempt to raise $400 million raised 
only $310 million. Garbade, supra note 6, at 31, 39. 
 9. In doing so, the buyer is said to be adding “market liquidity” to the financial product. See 
José Gabilondo, Leveraged Liquidity: Bear Raids and Junk Loans in the New Credit Marker, 34 J. 
CORP. L. 447, 472 (2009). 
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sue.10 In the secondary market (all subsequent deals), market makers per-
form a similar function by using their own capital to trade against the 
trend—buying when the customer wants to sell and selling when the cus-
tomer wants to buy.11 
Between March and December 2008, the Fed used its section 13(3) 
emergency powers to act like a market maker in the primary and second-
ary markets for credit products.12 To tailor these efforts to the new credit 
market, the Fed created limited-liability companies and ran secured lend-
ing programs, especially for nonbank firms that had become active in the 
credit market.13 These companies and programs added liquidity to “struc-
tured finance,” so called because these are assets created by rearranging 
                                                     
 10. When market makers are managing liquidity, prices adjust more slowly than they would 
otherwise because the market maker is applying gentle but steady price pressure in the opposite 
direction of a customer order that might otherwise go unmet. The liquidity boosts the value of the 
financial product because owners know that they can sell the product quickly without taking a “fire 
sale” discount. Having a steady flow of transactions helps other investors who own the product price 
their existing positions. Making it easier for a firm to convert the financial product into cash helps 
that firm’s individual liquidity because if cash is needed for settlement, the product can be liquidated 
in a pinch. Because market-making liquidity stabilizes prices and mitigates breakdowns on either 
side of the market, both the issuer of a financial product and investors in that product benefit from 
the efforts of the market maker, who makes money by capturing a spread between what it buys and 
sells for. 
 11. Here is a good description of how some market makers see their role: 
“Market maker” is a native term. It expresses the trader’s sense that he creates the market 
by his own action. He stands at the center of the market mechanism. In continuous mar-
kets, such as stocks, bonds, and futures, there are specified trading hours. During trading 
hours the market maker is always available, offering to trade from his own inventory in 
response to market user’s order flow. In a broader, collective sense, market makers have 
also been the market organizers. They establish and maintain the trading floors. They do 
this by standardizing terms of trade, by enacting and enforcing rules of conduct, and by 
creating institutions to ensure that all traders’ obligations are met. 
MITCHEL Y. ABOLOFIA, MAKING MARKETS: OPPORTUNISM AND RESTRAINT ON WALL STREET 6 
(1996). There are many ways to arrange market-making systems. See generally YAKOV AMIHUD, 
THOMAS S.Y. HO & ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ, MARKET MAKING AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF 
THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 113 (1985). 
 12. With the exception of one lending program, this Article considers only emergency-liquidity 
initiatives implemented by the Fed under section 13(3), primarily for nonbank firms. In addition to 
these initiatives, the Fed also used its section 13(3) authority to enter into a loan or a loss-sharing 
guarantee with Bear Stearns, Citigroup, and Bank of America. Johnson, supra note 1, at 14. Alt-
hough these three transactions complemented the Fed’s emergency liquidity programs, they are not 
examples of the market making that this Article examines. Moreover, these firms have paid exit fees 
and terminated these programs. Id. Similarly, though I draw on some documents related to the Trou-
bled Assets Relief Program, this Article does not consider other bank liquidity programs established 
by the Treasury or Congress. 
 13. These programs made assets more liquid insofar as they could be converted to cash quickly 
and easily. This kind of liquidity “speaks to the ease with which one can trade an asset (in this case, 
a loan) at its expected price. You can gauge market liquidity by measuring the difference between 
the sale price and the purchase price of a fungible commodity: the narrower this spread, the more 
liquid the market is said to be.” Gabilondo, supra note 9, at 457 (internal citation omitted). 
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the cash flow from other financial instruments.14 Just as last resort lend-
ing made banks more liquid, these emergency programs made structured 
finance assets and their investors more liquid.15 By doing this, the Fed 
calmed down credit markets, was repaid on its emergency lending, and 
put taxpayers in a position where we stand to make even more money on 
these deals.16 
As a magazine cover noted, however, “Ben Bernanke saved the 
global economy. So why does everyone hate him?”17 Rounding out the 
debate, this Article argues that the Fed’s section 13(3) efforts were large-
ly compelled by structural changes in the credit market. Once traditional 
banks had been overtaken by nonbank lenders and a capital markets-
based model for financing themselves, the Fed had little choice but to 
become a market maker of last resort, stabilizing the credit market by 
adding liquidity, term, and price discovery.18 A separate article will ex-
amine the financial overhang to the Fed from these efforts.19 
                                                     
 14. Johnson, supra note 1, at 7. He identifies six major activities: (1) tamping down the Fed 
funds rate; (2) discount window lending; (3) foreign-currency swaps with foreign central banks; (4) 
individualized lending to non-depository institutions; (5) general lending programs for non-
depository institutions; and (6) large-scale purchases of mortgage-backed securities. 
 15. A firm is liquid insofar as it can pay its debts as they become due. When asset liquidity 
dries up, a firm’s liquidity can follow. These liquidity dynamics were especially acute in the inter-
bank market. Gabilondo, supra note 9, at 456–60. 
 16. The notion of “market maker of last resort” is an analogy to the lender-of-last-resort func-
tion. MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30354, MONETARY POLICY AND THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE: CURRENT POLICY AND CONDITIONS 2 (Aug. 3, 2012) (“Its financial stability function is as 
“lender of last resort” to the nation’s financial system.”). 
 17. Roger Lowenstein, The Hero/The Villain, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 2012, at 49. Indeed, the 
consensus in the legal community is also that the Fed got it wrong. Robert D. Auerbach, The Fed’s 
Backroom Bailout Policy, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 535 (2009) (blaming the Fed’s autonomy for alleged 
defects in its stabilizing activities); Timothy Chapman, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the 
Rule of Law: From Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 369, 391–96 (2009) (concluding that Fed’s capture by banking interests drove its stabi-
lizing activities); Chad Emerson, The Illegal Actions of the Federal Reserve: An Analysis of How 
The Nation’s Central Bank Has Acted Outside the Law In Responding to the Current Financial 
Crisis, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 109 (2010) (concluding that the Fed exceeded its authorities 
and mission); Alexander Mehra, Legal Authority in Unusual and Exigent Circumstances: The Fed-
eral Reserve and the Financial Crisis, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 221 (2010) (finding that some stabilizing 
transactions exceeded the Fed’s statutory authority). 
 18. Bruce Mizrach & Christopher J. Neely, The Microstructure of the U.S. Treasury Market 19 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2007-052B, 2008) (“A crucial issue in the 
market microstructure literature is price discovery. This is the process by which prices embed new 
information.”). 
 19. The Fed’s emergency liquidity programs changed its financial structure such that it tripled 
in size, diversified its assets, got more leveraged as banks increased their reserves, and became more 
profitable. Trying to understand these changes and their regulatory implications induced this Article. 
As my research proceeded, however, so many unaddressed normative questions remained in the 
legal and policy literature about the trading that had been the predicate for these financial changes 
that I concluded that a more basic analysis of the Fed’s trading (this Article) was needed to frame the 
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 This Article focuses on the historical, legal, and policy justifica-
tions for the Fed’s actions and concludes that the Fed’s actions were 
readily defensible on several grounds. First, the Fed’s recent efforts were 
just the latest expression of the Fed’s open-ended authority to trade fi-
nancial products for its own account, especially during credit emergen-
cies.20 Second, the policy rationale for these efforts is that credit market 
dynamics had become influenced by a “shadow banking” sector that a 
traditional lender of last resort could not reach.21 To influence the con-
temporary version of the traditional credit function—borrowing short to 
lend long term—the Fed would have to expand its emergency liquidity 
facilities.22 Finally, the Fed’s market making is congruent with the Fed’s 
century-old symbiotic relationship with banks, so we should reconsider 
our naiveté about what has long been a corporatist relationship.23 
This argument has four steps. Part I is an argumentative history that 
emphasizes the Fed’s past as a financial-products trader for its own ac-
count.24 The goal is to counter its more familiar—yet incomplete—
incarnation as a traditional lender of last resort. As both author and regu-
lator of a financial system, the Fed’s authority was generative, unfolding 
as its target markets and its own responses evolved.25 Fruit of a difficult 
                                                                                                   
genealogy of the Fed’s balance sheet. In a separate article, I will address how the Fed’s expanded 
trading activities financialized the Fed’s asset, liability, and equity accounts. 
 20. The term “generative” refers to the way that Melvin Eisenberg describes adjudication by 
common law judges. See generally MELVIN EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1991) 
(insisting that structural gaps exist in positive formulations of legal rules and that judges routinely 
act interstitially to complete the rule through particular decisions). Because credit markets can pre-
sent the same variety and unpredictability that fact patterns do to a common law judge, the transac-
tional means that the Fed has at its disposal must be equal to the task. 
 21. ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 458, SHADOW 
BANKING (2010) (analyzing how the shadow banking sector funds itself). 
 22. This is one of the defining functions of a bank. José Gabilondo, So Now Who Is Special?: 
Business Model Shifts Among Firms That Borrow to Lend, 4 MD. J. BUS. & TECH. L. 261, 265 & 
n.38 (2009). Doing so is fraught with peril. POZSAR ET AL., supra note 21, at 1 (“However, credit 
intermediaries’ reliance on short-term liabilities to fund illiquid long-term assets is an inherently 
fragile activity and may be prone to runs.”). 
 23. Corporatism refers to “a system of social and political organization in which major societal 
groups or interests (labor, business, military, ethnic, clan or patronage groups, religious bodies) are 
integrated into the governmental system, often on a monopolistic basis or under state guidance, 
tutelage and control, to achieve coordinate national development.” HOWARD J. WIARDA, 
CORPORATISM AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS: THE OTHER GREAT “ISM” 84 (1997). 
 24. Not trained as an economic historian, I have rendered the past based on a contemporary 
understanding of how financial markets work. Professional historians continue to contest basic fac-
tual conclusions about the Fed’s role in previous financial crises. Perhaps unlike a professional histo-
rian, I advocate a normative conclusion, informed by history. 
 25. One example would be the statutory mandate that the Fed create a market for bankers’ 
acceptances: “the provisions of the Act with respect to bankers’ acceptances had as their objective 
the development of a market for what was considered a new type of commercial paper in the United 
States.” HOWARD H. HACKLEY, LENDING FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS: A 
HISTORY 53 (1973). 
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birth, the Fed went from being a banker’s bank in the Progressive Era to 
a market maker for Treasury securities, maturing into a real central bank 
only in the post-War period after its independence from the Treasury. Its 
trading authority has grown steadily, especially since the enactment of its 
section 13(3) emergency powers during the Great Depression. 
When bad things happen to good assets, a central bank should lend 
until things get back to normal.26 As described in Part II, though, in 2008 
the Fed lent against seemingly dubious collateral—structured finance—
by setting up limited-liability companies and secured lending programs 
that extended the Fed’s emergency liquidity protection beyond banks.27 
These “financial hospitals” breathed value into moribund assets by hold-
ing them to maturity, making them liquid by exchanging them for cash-
equivalents, and providing price discovery by trading them when other 
firms did not want to.28 These financial hospitals represented the Fed’s 
shift from just a lender of last resort to also a market maker of last re-
sort.29 
Part III examines the impact of making this shift on the Fed’s polit-
ical legitimacy as a market actor. Did these expanded liquidity efforts 
interfere with market dynamics?30 Quite the contrary. By replicating 
                                                     
 26. Otherwise, it can be the economy as a whole that suffers. Kevin Warsh, Governor, Fed. 
Res. Sys., Speech at the New York University School of Law Global Economic Policy Forum: Fi-
nancial Turmoil and the Federal Reserve: The Plot Thickens (Apr. 14, 2008) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/warsh20080414a.htm) (“The central bank’s re-
sponsibility is not to individual firms but to financial markets, and only then, to the extent that finan-
cial market stresses affect the real economy.”). 
 27. From the perspective of credit quality, the worst deal was Maiden Lane III, which invested 
in asset-backed securities that were themselves collateralized not by a real cash flow but by other 
asset-backed securities. I explain this by analyzing the audited financial statements of the Fed’s 
collateral deals. See infra notes 251–59 and accompanying text. 
 28. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 115 (“[T]he central lesson of the crisis is that the American 
system requires the Fed’s support as dealer of last resort, not just in the money market . . . but also in 
the capital market, and not just for Treasury securities . . . but also for private securities.”). Professor 
Steven Schwarcz has argued that financial markets need an entity to provide market liquidity be-
cause shifts in the credit market have increased the importance of new lenders and products. Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 248–57 
(2009). Such an entity would invest against a bear cycle when falling prices were due to a panicky 
market. Id. at 248–49. This entity would buy “securities of artificially falling financial markets—
markets in which the price of securities falls measurably below the intrinsic value of the assets un-
derlying the securities (which might result from a panic).” Id. The Fed did a version of this. 
 29. See MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 115 (arguing that the Fed became a dealer of last resort); 
Buiter & Sibert, supra note 5 (arguing that Fed should act as a market maker of last resort); Thorvald 
Grung Moe, Shadow Banking and the Limits of Central Bank Liquidity Support: How to Achieve a 
Better Balance Between Global and Official Liquidity 5–6 (Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 
172, 2012) (calling for a “new Bagehot rule” for market maker of last resort role). 
 30. One of the initial obstacles to understanding the Fed is that much of what it does amounts 
to trying to engineer price outcomes, blurring any bright-line distinction between the public and the 
private. José Gabilondo, Sending the Right Signals: Using Rent-Seeking Theory to Analyze the Cu-
ban Central Bank, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 483, 490 (2005) (“[A] central bank is perhaps the only gov-
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market standards—including fair-value accounting and collateralization 
norms31—these efforts created a constructive market and jumpstarted 
trading in the secondary market. Were these efforts legal? Yes. They 
rested on statutory authority intended for just such emergencies. Did 
some of these efforts lack the transparency popularly associated with 
democratic oversight of the economy? I am afraid so, but it may be a 
price worth paying. When it comes to the financial sector, the Fed strikes 
an original balance between public and private interests with special ben-
efits for both. Overall, this bargain makes sense, a point with which the 
antigovernment Right and the finance-phobic Left should jointly disa-
gree. 
Part IV recommends the repeal of a provision in the Dodd–Frank 
Act of 2010 that requires the Fed to get the Treasury’s approval before 
doing such programs in the future.32 Hearkening to the Fed’s past as a 
market maker hostage to the Treasury, this is a bad idea because it fur-
ther politicizes the Fed’s emergency liquidity programs. 
II. THE FED’S HISTORICAL TRADING AUTHORITIES 
For purposes of this Article, change gears by thinking of a lender as 
a borrower looking for funds to lend. This is called “funding” a loan.33 
Say you apply for a $100,000 mortgage loan and—wanting predictabil-
ity—prefer a fixed-rate loan with repayment spread out over thirty years. 
Assume that the lender lends to you at 5%. It looks for the best rate it can 
find in its funding market, say $100,000 for one year at 1% payable at 
maturity. By borrowing at 1% for one year and lending at 5% for thirty 
                                                                                                   
ernment actor that performs its regulatory functions on the market by transacting in the market again 
and again.”). 
 31. For a discussion of the accounting and collateral aspects of the Fed’s programs, see infra 
notes 226–35, 240–59. 
 32. See infra notes 444–59. 
 33. Funding a loan means moving cash from the bank’s financial backer through the bank and 
to its client. In an accounting sense, it means that the balance sheet for the bank reflects an asset 
based on the loan to the client, offset by some blend of liability and equity reflecting who the bank 
got the funds from. When its cost of funds is less than its return on those funds, the bank makes 
money. A recent analysis of net interest margins for national banks suggests how low interest rates 
can undermine bank profitability: “after three consecutive years of record low interest rates, banks 
are unlikely to realize further benefits from lower funding costs. Given a fairly static outlook for 
interest rates and loan growth in 2012, net interest margins will likely show little incremental im-
provement in the near term.” OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SEMIANNUAL RISK 
PERSPECTIVE FROM THE NATIONAL RISK COMMITTEE 15 (Spring 2012); see also OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK ON INTEREST RATE RISK (1998) 
(providing analysis and examination procedures for interest rate risk management in a national 
bank’s credit portfolio) (“Interest rate risk is the risk to earnings or capital arising from movement of 
interest rates. It arises from differences between the timing of rate changes and the timing of cash 
flows . . . from changing rate relationships among yield curves . . . from changing rate relationships 
across the spectrum of maturities.”). 
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years, the lender immediately becomes illiquid. Why? During the next 
year, it will receive a trickle of cash flow from its thirty-year asset (you), 
but not enough to repay its debt of $100,000. So the lender must re-
finance at the end of the year.34 Imagine if lenders did not do this—it 
would be you refinancing your mortgage or student loans every year or 
even more frequently.35 
This happens in the “funding” market, with which the Fed has al-
ways had an intimate relationship. The drafters wrote the Federal Re-
serve Act with banks in mind as the lenders.36 The drafters saw that 
fragmented markets made it hard for banks to mobilize the funding need-
ed to finance business conditions. They hoped that a decentralized sys-
tem of regional lenders that could trade short-term debt would help banks 
fund themselves. Once the system was up and running, though, the Fed 
found that it was better to buy and sell government securities in the open 
market. It was the beginning of its career as trader. 
A. Bank Funding Before the Fed 
Paper money began in the American colonies during the seven-
teenth century.37 This money included private debt instruments in the 
form of letters of credit and bills of exchange.38 Also, private banks char-
tered under state law issued promissory notes that served as money.39 
The value of the notes fluctuated based on the issuing bank’s reputation. 
                                                     
 34. Because the bank will have received one year’s worth of interest and principal from its 
borrower, this time it will need to borrow less than $100,000. And so on. Assuming that it refinances 
only with one-year loans, the bank will do this twenty-eight more times before the mortgage is paid 
off. 
 35. It was when collateral markets froze up that the most acute episodes of the financial crisis 
took place. Donald L. Kohn, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Columbia Busi-
ness School Conference on the Role of Money Markets: Money Markets and Financial Stability 
(May 29, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
kohn20080529a.htm (explaining how securitization had made collateral markets a more central part 
of the credit market). Within this market, repurchase agreements emerged as particularly important. 
Peter Hördahl & Michael R. King, Developments in Repo Markets During the Financial Turmoil, 
BIS Q. REV., Dec. 8, 2008, at 37, 42–51 (emphasizing that risk management and operational risk in 
repo markets deserve more attention). 
 36. I use the term “bank” to mean financial institutions that hold customer deposits. This in-
cludes firms that did universal banking before the Glass–Steagall Act of 1933 as well as those sub-
sequently defined as “depository institutions” for purposes of federal banking regulation. By “non-
bank” I mean not only broker–dealer investment banks but also other firms that borrow to lend in the 
“shadow banking” sector. POZSAR ET AL., supra note 21. 
 37. 1 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 48–49 (2002) 
(noting Virginia bill of exchange from 1668 and private letter of credit from 1718). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Because not all depositors will demand their money back at the same time, the bank gam-
bles by loaning out its liquid funds for repayment over a longer term. Other than what the market 
will bear, there is no theoretical limit to how much money a bank can make by leveraging its de-
mand deposits this way, unless a law or regulation provided otherwise. 
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Colonial governments also began to issue bills of credit to finance public 
expenditures.40 
As a financial system, this left a lot to be desired. Rather than a sin-
gle dominant currency, private bank notes and other forms of money pro-
liferated. Also, credit and money markets were fragmented, limiting their 
ability to respond flexibly to changes in business conditions.41 
In particular, it was hard to solve a liquidity panic without a central 
authority to provide stopgap funding to stem a bank run.42 If depositor 
requests for withdrawals were honored quickly and in an orderly manner, 
a panic would pass as depositors recovered confidence that their money 
would be safe with the bank. This method required a deep pocket to act 
as a lender of last resort to fund withdrawals until the panic passed. A 
central bank following Bagehot’s policy for emergency liquidity could 
serve this role, but establishing a central authority in the United States 
would face many hurdles. 
Alexander Hamilton saw the advantages of a more unified financial 
system.43 Regional markets would be linked, trade could increase, and 
more could be done to limit financial panics. The question of paper mon-
ey was related to a unified system. In 1729 and again in 1767, Benjamin 
Franklin advocated for having more paper money because it would add 
to real wealth by boosting commodity prices and wages and encouraging 
manufacturing.44 Inspired by the Bank of England, Hamilton tried to es-
tablish a Bank of the United States in 1790, making southern planters 
                                                     
 40. 1 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 50–51 (Benjamin Franklin had recommended their issue). 
 41. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 31 (“The inelasticity of the note issue, combined with the 
rigidity of required reserve ratios, meant that deposits could not so easily expand and contract as 
needed.”). Disagreeing, some economic historians view early financial markets as more integrated. 
See generally HOWARD BODENHORN, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN ANTEBELLUM 
AMERICA: FINANCIAL MARKETS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AN ERA OF NATION-BUILDING 
(2000) (arguing that antebellum financial markets were fairly well-integrated until the Civil War). 
 42. Between 1873 and 1907, the banking system experienced five major panics when particular 
firms could not meet their obligations. Eugene White, To Establish a More Effective Supervision of 
Banking: How the Birth of the Fed Altered Bank Supervision (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 16825, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16825. These liquidity 
crises would likely have been avoided by a lender of last resort. Michael D. Bordo & David C. 
Wheelock, The Promise and Performance of the Federal Reserve as Lender of Last Resort 1914–
1933, FED. RES. BANK ATL., http:// www.frbatlanta.org/documents/news/conferences/10jekyll_ 
bordo_pres.pptx (last visited Nov. 17, 2012) (“The recurrent instability of the National Banking Era 
was the principal motivation of the reform movement that led to the Federal Reserve Act.”); see also 
White, supra at 26 (“Contemporary experts and most historians believe that a lender of last resort 
could have squelched most panics by providing credit to liquidity-constrained banks in the midst of a 
crisis.”). 
 43. See generally RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 344–61 (2004). 
 44. Id.; 1 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 50, 56 (mentioning Franklin’s 1729 Modest Enquiry 
into the Nature and Necessity of A Paper Currency and his 1767 Remarks and Facts Concerning 
American Paper Money). 
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bristle.45 In the end, Congress chartered the Bank of the United States, 
which operated from 1792 until the expiration of its charter in 1811.46 A 
second Bank of the United States was attempted after the War of 1812, 
but it was abolished twenty years later.47 
Soon enough, the drawbacks of not having a central banking au-
thority became apparent. Congress wanted to increase federal control 
over credit to promote a stable, uniform currency, make it easier for 
banks to fund themselves, and give the authorities a tool for adjusting the 
money supply.48 It started issuing paper money—United States notes—in 
1862.49 
Congress also began considering the notion of bank reserve re-
quirements. Banks created money because—except in a run—all of their 
depositors would not want to recover their deposits at the same time.50 So 
banks were able to issue liabilities that people used as money. Out of 
prudence, a bank had to keep some cash in its vault—its reserves—to 
satisfy the anticipated withdrawal requests of some depositors, but the 
bank could lend out the rest.51 Reserves went to the heart of the incipient 
                                                     
 45. Dependent on credit, they feared that the Bank would advantage the New England mercan-
tile establishment, a protean version of today’s financial sector. CHERNOW, supra note 43, at 349. 
(“Some central-bank critics thought the institution would aggrandize northern merchants at the ex-
pense of southern agrarians.”). The conflict would draw lines in the sand that would later harden into 
the system of political parties that we recognize today. Id. at 351. 
 46. 1 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 89. The Bank earned the enmity of competing state banks 
by helping the United States obtain a high credit rating. Id. at 122. By a close vote, its charter was 
not renewed in 1811. Id. at 126–27. 
 47. DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC 36 
(2009). 
 48. I use “money supply” to mean the sum generally of cash and credit in the economy. Be-
cause this Article spans periods during which different forms of money and credit existed, I do not 
use more recent measures of monetary aggregates. See generally R.W. HAFER, THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE SYSTEM: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 258–62 (2005) (entry on “MONEY” summarizing its history 
and its empirical measurement by the Fed); Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins of 
Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation, in FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL 
CRISES 109, 164 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 1991) (noting that “authors frequently used the terms 
‘money’ and ‘money market’ loosely, sometimes meaning cash, sometimes credit”). 
 49. Legal Tender Act of February 25, 1862, 12 Stat. 345. These notes were redeemable in gold 
between 1879 and 1933. 
 50. Joshua N. Feinman, Reserve Requirements: History, Current Practice, and Potential Re-
form, 79 FED. RES. BULL. 569, 569 (1993). 
 51. A “reserve” is an amount of cash held in a bank’s vault or in an account with the Fed from 
which it can draw to meet customers’ demand for currency. From the point of view of an individual 
bank, keeping enough reserves avoids the unfortunate situation in which customers demand more 
cash than the bank has on hand, leading to a run. This insurance against a customer run on deposits 
did not come free, though, because until very recently, banks earned no money on reserves, meaning 
there was an opportunity cost in terms of foregone return from investing those reserves into loans or 
other investments. Hence a bank’s goal was to keep as little in reserves as possible and to relend any 
reserves in excess of what was required by federal banking regulation. 
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credit system, influencing both sides of a bank’s balance sheet.52 In time, 
states imposed reserve requirements to make sure that the bank had 
enough cash in the vault to honor a depositor’s demands for cash.53 
Congress took a step towards federalizing the money supply with 
the National Bank Act of 1864, which offered a national bank charter.54 
The cost was that national banks had to hold a 25% reserve against their 
deposits and notes, more than the amount required by most states.55 More 
would be needed, though, to create a national financial system. 
B. The Banker’s Bank (1913–1923) 
One of the important ways that banks funded themselves was 
through short-term commercial paper.56 When a farmer needed credit to 
finance a crop or a merchant needed credit to buy goods, the farmer or 
merchant would borrow money from a bank and issue it a promissory 
note, typically for a short term and without security or collateral. The 
bank “discounted” the note, giving the borrower less than the face value, 
just as you do when lending to the federal government by buying a sav-
ings bond.57 When the borrower repaid the face value of the note, the 
lender captured the discount as interest, with higher discount rates result-
ing in more interest being paid. 
                                                     
 52. Decisions about which kind of asset to hold—for example, holding vault cash or making a 
loan—turned not just on a borrower’s credit but on the bank’s reserve position. This also affected a 
bank’s liability structure because deciding to make a new loan from liberated reserves meant the 
bank could finance it with new borrowing, thus becoming more leveraged. 
 53. To make sure that banks could honor the demands of their clients for cash, rules required 
banks to keep a certain amount of cash on reserve in their vaults. Cash on hand in excess of the 
required reserves could be lent out, although some would have to be held back to ensure that the new 
loan was backed by enough reserves. The strictest system would allow a bank to lend out only the 
amount that it had to spare assuming that all depositors were paid. In contrast, states used a fraction-
al reserve system that let banks lend out a multiple of their demand deposits: the higher the reserve 
requirement, the lower the bank’s ability to gross up its assets by making new loans. Initially, states 
did not require issuing banks to keep reserves on hand, although some banks did so to make their 
notes more attractive. Feinman, supra note 50, at 572. Some states imposed reserve requirements 
during the nineteenth century, but most states had no such requirements when the Civil War began in 
1861. 
 54. National Bank Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 99. 
 55. Feinman, supra note 50, at 572. 
 56. Timothy D. Rowe, Commercial Paper, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET 111–25 
(Timothy Q. Cook & Timothy D. Rowe eds., 6th ed. 1986). This kind of debt is key because if the 
firm is not liquid enough to honor the debt, it becomes an issue of solvency. 
 57. Because money is a commodity that has use value (it buys things and settles debts), a lend-
er demands interest as compensation for parting with this use value over the life of a loan. These 
notes did not pay interest. 
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Relevant to funding, the commercial paper market also let the bank 
control its own liquidity.58 It could pledge the discounted note to another 
bank, which would lend a smaller fraction of the note’s face value by 
“rediscounting.”59 This gave banks in a funding pinch an alternative to 
selling their assets at a fire sale price.60 The commercial paper market 
was fragmented, however, requiring concerted action by Congress to uni-
fy regional markets. Given the objections to central banking, this would 
be a tough sell in Congress. 
The Panic of 1907 helped to make the case for a central bank.61 The 
1907 crisis had been solved only through the collective action of private 
bankers led by J.P. Morgan.62 The following year, Congress established a 
national commission to analyze the Panic of 1907 and to propose a 
mechanism to avoid a recurrence of financial disruptions.63 The commis-
sion concluded that only a central bank authority could effectively miti-
gate the risk of crises like the Panic of 1907.64 The National Reserve As-
sociation proposed by the commission, however, involved a decentral-
ized arrangement of regional banks that would be operated largely by 
private bankers.65 
This plan failed because, as seen by the Senate and the House, it 
gave large banks too much power.66 Also, some favored centralization 
while others favored the dispersal of power between regional reserve 
banks.67 After Woodrow Wilson became President, Virginia Representa-
tive Carter Glass took responsibility for shepherding the project.68 He 
introduced an alternative to the commission’s bill that was eventually 
enacted as the Act after several compromises that balanced the reformist 
                                                     
 58. At the time, banks also entered into repurchase agreements to get short-term liquidity by 
pledging collateral. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 34 (noting that the “asset structure” of banks includ-
ed securities other than commercial loans that could be used as collateral for loans). 
 59. HACKLEY, supra note 25, at 11. 
 60. Id. 
 61. It involved the failure of the Knickerbocker Trust Company, which threatened to bring 
down other firms too. That time, private collection action coordinated by J. Pierpont Morgan 
stemmed the panic by investing against the trend. 2 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 31–34. 
 62. Id. 
 63. The details of the plan emerged after a retreat at Georgia resort, Jekyll Island, owned by 
John D. Rockefeller and J.P. Morgan. Id. at 44–45 (analyzing origin of the Fed). 
 64. Id. at 42 (“The Monetary Commission concluded that a central banking authority was 
needed to provide liquidity in times of stress.”). 
 65. Id. at 43 (analyzing origin of the Fed). 
 66. TIM TODD, THE BALANCE OF POWER 11 (Bill Medley ed., 2009); see also 2 MARKHAM 
supra note 37, at 44. 
 67. TODD, supra note 66, at 12–13. 
 68. Id. at 12. 
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impulses of the Progressive Era with the preference of bankers for self-
regulation.69 
The resulting Act created a central board in Washington and a 
loosely federated network of reserve banks with ties to their local econ-
omies.70 The system was expected to serve several goals. First, the Fed 
would support bank funding by creating liquidity facilities that would 
allow banks to convert their assets into cash or cash equivalents.71 These 
facilities could also serve the lender of last resort function to help man-
age panics like the one in 1907.72 Second, the Fed would also make the 
credit supply more responsive to the needs of business by making the 
currency “elastic,” in that its size would fluctuate with business condi-
tions.73 Third, the Fed would have authority both to lend money through 
discounting and to buy and sell some financial assets in the open mar-
ket.74 Congress also gave the Fed “incidental powers” to carry out its 
activities.75 
These authorities were “generative” because the Fed was expected 
to both create money systems and regulate them. So, for example, in ad-
dition to rediscounting commercial paper, the Fed was charged with de-
veloping a market for banker’s acceptances, a way to give banks another 
source of funding liquidity.76 The Fed was also expected to develop a 
national system for check clearing.77 
                                                     
 69. WIARDA, supra note 23, at 134 (“[T]he Progressives sought to rein in and regulate the 
largely unchecked capitalism of the time. Labor unions were also becoming stronger; the social 
question was coming to the fore.”). 
 70. The Act produced twelve reserve banks and a board in Washington to which the Secretary 
of the Treasury belonged ex officio. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 37. The board represented centraliza-
tion while the reserve banks served proxies for the regions. TODD, supra note 66, at 13–14. During 
the early days of the Fed, the regional reserve banks were associated with private interests while the 
board was seen as closer to the government. 1 ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE 467 (2003) (discussing proposals by incoming Fed chair Eccles to limit the power of the 
regional Reserve banks). The New York Federal Reserve emerged as the leader of the latter. TODD, 
supra note 66, at 19–22. 
 71. 2 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 46–47. 
 72. Id. at 9–12; HACKLEY, supra note 25, at 9–12. 
 73. 2 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 46–47. 
 74. The Act gave the Fed two separate grants of power relevant to financial markets. The Fed 
could enter into collateralized loans to its member banks by “discounting” certain financial assets. 
Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 13, 38 Stat. 251, 263 (1913). The Fed could also enter 
into “open market” transactions, which were purchase and sale transactions on a wider variety of 
assets with virtually any counterparty. Id. § 14, 38 Stat. at 264. This Article groups both discounting 
and open market transactions as “trading” by the Fed because—for purposes of my discussion—both 
share the same nucleus of investment risk and produce similar liquidity effects, for both the Fed and 
its counterparty. Combining the authorities this way is consistent with the modern approach of 12 
U.S.C. § 412 to collateral for the issuance of Federal Reserve notes. 
 75. 12 U.S.C. § 341 (1913). 
 76. 2 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 46–47. 
 77. Id. 
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Rediscounting was central to liquidity, currency elasticity, and the 
lender-of-last-resort function because the Fed would pursue all three pol-
icies through its “discount window,” the physical site of these deals.78 
When a customer wanted dollars, the customer would tender a bill to the 
bank, and the bank would discount it. If the bank needed currency, it 
could present that bill at the Fed’s window, which would rediscount it by 
giving the bank cash or, more likely, crediting its reserve ledger at the 
Fed.79 The cash (or the ledger adjustment) would leave the bank with 
more reserves than before the transaction, meaning that the bank now 
had fresh resources that it could lend or invest.80 Assuming a healthy 
profit interest on the part of the bank and demand for credit, the bank 
would make new loans. This made credit and money elastic because their 
supply would increase to fund growth.81 The same thing would happen in 
reverse.82 The Fed would later find other ways to influence reserves.83 
                                                     
 78. Rediscounting would go to the heart of the Fed’s mission, as suggested by the Act’s pre-
amble: “to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, [and] to 
establish a more effective supervision of the banking in the United States.” Federal Reserve Act, 38 
Stat. 251, 251; see also HACKLEY, supra note 25, at 9 (listing creation of commercial paper market 
as the first major purpose of the Act). 
 79. HACKLEY, supra note 25, at 11. 
 80. Id. at 3 (noting importance of rediscounting provisions to the House and Senate Banking 
and Currency Committees). The Act also introduced Federal Reserve notes to substitute for national 
bank notes. National banks were still allowed to issue circulating bank notes after the Fed was estab-
lished, provided that they kept certain reserves and that they collateralized the issuance of these 
notes with United States bonds posted with the Treasury. That way, if called to redeem a national 
bank note, the Treasury could reimburse itself for the costs of doing so. National banks stopped 
issuing notes after 1935, although at least as of 1981, there were still outstanding notes. 
 81. Id. at 11. 
 82. As a customer paid off its commercial bill to the bank, the bank would settle with the Fed. 
Thus, the money supply would shrink as the original borrower paid off the bills. Since 1961, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago has published a superb workbook that explains how reserve ad-
justments impact both an individual bank and the national money supply. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK 
OF CHICAGO, MODERN MONEY MECHANICS: A WORKBOOK ON BANK RESERVES AND DEPOSIT 
EXPANSION (2011). To absorb cash from banks it must sell securities cheaply enough, and to add 
cash to bank balance sheets the Fed must pay enough to make banks sell their securities. There is 
one difference between reserve expansion through open market purchases by the Fed of government 
securities and reserve contraction through open market sales by the Fed. Id. at 12. When the Fed 
wants to shrink the money supply, banks must go through the serial liquidation of offsetting asset-
liability positions to bring down the amount of reservable liabilities to that amount that can be sup-
ported by the lower amount of reserves. Id. In contrast, when the Fed wants to expand the money 
supply, it is relying on the bank’s goal of increasing financial return to engage in market transactions 
to relend the fresh deposits. Id. Now that the Fed pays interest on excess reserve balances, banks 
may have less of an incentive to leverage their excess reserves. 
 83. Today, the Fed has several ways of influencing bank reserves. First, by rule the Fed can 
adjust the calculation of the reserve requirement to lower or raise the number directly. Second, the 
Fed can make it easier for banks to meet their reserve requirements by lending them money at the 
Fed’s discount rate, an interest rate that is set by Board policy on certain collateralized loans. Giving 
banks access to cheap money through the discount window has the effect of relaxing reserve pres-
sure on the banks. Third, the Fed can also make cheap money available to a bank by buying some of 
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The Fed was expected to make a uniform discount rate effective 
across the country.84 Because what would qualify for discounting as 
commercial paper was not clear, the Act gave the Fed discretion to make 
this determination. At first, discounting by the Fed was subject to strict 
limitations through the “real bills” doctrine, which restricted eligibility 
for discount to short-term instruments deemed to have little default risk.85 
Restricting the kind of assets that could be pledged as collateral limited 
the ability of banks to get funding. Moreover, the Federal Reserve could 
issue notes only against collateral that was eligible for discount. These 
two restrictions limited how much “give” the credit supply had. 
Some Members of Congress had urged for the original statute to 
create a system that could lend directly to individuals.86 Congress reject-
ed this idea, though, because the Fed was intended as a system of “bank-
ers’ banks” that would not compete with commercial banks in the retail 
credit market.87 Credit allocation to nonbanks was also seen as a political 
decision, better left to other parts of government in charge of fiscal 
spending.88 
Nevertheless, Congress began expanding the Fed’s lending authori-
ty almost immediately, starting with authority to provide credit through 
                                                                                                   
the securities in a bank’s investment portfolio. Called “open market” operations, these transactions 
are priced on market terms, instead of being priced administratively. As with the proceeds of dis-
count window borrowing, the proceeds from selling securities can be deposited with the Fed as a 
reserve. Fourth, the Fed can reduce the cost to a bank of obtaining financial resources for meeting 
reserve requirements by participating in the federal funds market, an over-the-counter market where 
banks sell their excess reserves and buy those of other banks. 
 84. The Fed will change the discount rate only in response to a request from a reserve bank. 
TIM TODD, UNDER PRESSURE: POLITICS AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE DURING THE 1990–1991 
RECESSION 51 (Lowell C. Jones ed., 2011), available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/ 
UnderPressure/UnderPressure.pdf. 
 85. At first, eligibility for rediscounting depended largely on the “real bills” doctrine. General-
ly, this meant that a bill also had to be negotiable, have a term of not more than ninety days, and be 
endorsed by the member bank that had originally discounted the bill. HACKLEY, supra note 25, at 
13–16, 22–24. The theory behind this doctrine (also known as the “commercial loan” doctrine) was a 
bank could limit its risk by lending only for activities that would generate a cash flow matching the 
terms of the loan repayment, i.e., “self-liquidating” paper. Id. at 191. Although advanced as a rule to 
limit risk, in hindsight it was understood to have contributed to economic cycles too, because an 
expanding economy would mean that there were more productive activities looking for financing. 
See Gabilondo, supra note 9, at 472 (arguing that the real bills doctrine illustrated Minsky’s hedge 
financing). In 1963, the Fed began to urge Congress to abolish these technical requirements and, 
instead, let the reserve banks rediscount any commercial paper deemed by them to be sound. 1963 
FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 198 (March 31, 1964) (recommending that technical requirements for 
collateral be eliminated). In 1970, the Board did away with the requirement that rediscounted bills be 
negotiable. 56 FED. RES. BULL. 444 (1970) (eliminating the requirement that discount window col-
lateral be negotiable). 
 86. HACKLEY, supra note 25, at 127. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Walker F. Todd, FDICIA’s Emergency Liquidity Provisions, 16 ECON. REV. 1 (1993) (not-
ing theoretical and policy limits on fiscal activities by central banks). 
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advances to its member banks.89 In 1916, Congress gave the Fed authori-
ty to make fifteen day collateralized advances.90 The collateral could in-
clude Treasury bonds, giving banks another way to get funded.91 In ef-
fect, Congress was allowing the Fed to issue notes against Treasury secu-
rities, as national banks had done.92 That same year, Congress also rec-
ognized the Fed’s role in making U.S. dollars available in foreign mar-
kets by letting the Fed rediscount banker’s acceptances for “dollar ex-
change,” a way to promote U.S. dollar-denominated trade finance.93 
C. Market Making (1923–1951) 
The son that the Act’s drafters had wanted was a banker’s bank to 
deal in private debt, that way helping banks fund themselves.94 Instead, 
the Fed found that trading government securities was a better way to in-
fluence credit conditions.95 This insight emerged out of the investment 
practices of the Reserve banks, which bought Treasury securities from 
commercial banks to boost their earnings.96 The selling banks would get 
cash, which would result in excess reserves, just as discounting commer-
cial paper had. Because cash (like reserves) was fungible, banks could 
fund loan growth without needing to use the Fed’s discount facilities.97 It 
worked in the other direction too.98 
It seemed, then, that by trading Treasury debt the Fed could influ-
ence bank reserves (and, hence, the money supply) just as discount win-
dow lending did.99 Trading was better than discounting, too, since it gave 
the Reserve banks more control over the purchases and sales.100 It also 
avoided the adverse selection risk implicit in discount window lending: 
banks with good credit tended not to use the discount window, which 
                                                     
 89. HACKLEY, supra note 25, at 83. 
 90. Id. at 84. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 752 (1916). 
 93. HACKLEY, supra note 25, at 65. 
 94. The Fed was to be a “banker’s bank that would set discount rates and issue notes backed 
with gold reserves and commercial paper.” 2 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 43. 
 95. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 35 (concluding that the rediscounting system did not work as 
intended). The Fed discovered the power of open market operations in government securities by 
“cosmic accident.” Id. at 37. 
 96. Minutes, Fed. Res. Open Market Comm., Dec. 19, 1923, at 4–6 [hereinafter Dec. 19, 1923 
Minutes]; see also 1 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 198–99 (explaining policy change in terms of ser-
endipity). 
 97. Dec. 19, 1923 Minutes, supra note 96. 
 98. When Reserve banks sold Treasury securities to commercial banks, these open market 
operations soaked up the cash that banks had, leaving them with fewer resources with which to make 
loans. So banks looking for funds would then discount more bills. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 5. 
748 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:731 
would be used most enthusiastically by banks with lousy credit. So the 
Fed decided to convert open-market operations from a revenue source for 
Reserve banks into a tool for national credit policy.101 New York Federal 
Reserve Bank (NYFRB) President Benjamin Strong had been advocating 
since 1915 that open market trading could have counter-cyclical effects 
that promoted financial stability.102 History would prove him right, alt-
hough it would take nearly a century. 
During the Depression, Congress reconsidered the ban on Fed lend-
ing to individuals. In 1932, the Senate considered amendments to the Act 
that would give the Fed authority to lend in “unusual and exigent circum-
stances” not only to individuals but also to corporations.103 Initially, the 
Senate proposed granting this authority only temporarily for two years.104 
The version of the authority that was finally signed by Herbert Hoover in 
1932 as section 13(3) of the Act was broader, making the authority per-
manent and including partnerships as potential borrowers.105 
Initially, these emergency powers imposed strict restrictions on the 
collateral eligible to be used for a section 13(3) loan, however, so rela-
tively few loans were made during the Depression.106 The Fed asked 
Congress to relax the collateral requirement.107 Three years after enact-
ment of the original authority, in what was styled as a “technical 
amendment,” Congress liberalized this authority by beginning to relax 
the collateral requirements of section 13(3) by letting the Fed choose be-
tween requiring that credit be endorsed or secured.108 
In 1935, Congress also validated the Fed’s policy shift towards 
trading government securities by statutorily establishing its Open Market 
                                                     
 101. The Fed adopted the policy “[t]hat the time, manner, character and volume of open-
market investments purchased by Federal Reserve banks be governed with primary regard to the 
accommodation of commerce and business and to the effect of such purchases or sales on the general 
credit situation.” Minutes, Federal Reserve Open Market Committee, Mar. 22, 1923, at 1 [hereinafter 
Mar. 22, 1923 Minutes]; see also 1 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 198–205 (explaining policy change 
in terms of serendipity). 
 102. 2 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 189. 
 103. HACKLEY, supra note 25, at 128. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 709; see also HACKLEY, supra 
note 25, at 128. Given how important this authority would turn out to be, this illustrates that Presi-
dent Hoover may deserve more credit for recognizing that the federal authorities had to intervene in 
the financial sector more broadly than they may have understood their role to be. Although history 
has credited Franklin Delano Roosevelt with many of the New Deal financial reforms, some of the 
proposals for them started as early as 1931 at the behest of Hoover. Walker F. Todd, FDICIA’s 
Emergency Liquidity Provisions, 3 ECON. REV. 16, 17 (1993) (noting Hoover’s attempt to expand the 
Fed’s lending authority to insolvent banks), 
 106. Id. at 18 (noting that between 1932 and 1936 only 123 loans for a total value of $1.5 mil-
lion were made under this authority). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 322, 49 Stat. 684. 
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Committee.109 Trading credit had now become a structural element of the 
Fed. Soon thereafter, the Fed announced that it would “maintain orderly 
conditions in the money market.”110 This signaled that the Fed was be-
ginning to think of itself more as a market maker. 
When the Fed had first started conducting open-market operations 
with government securities, the Treasury had objected, claiming that the-
se deals interfered with its own issuance goals.111 However, open-market 
purchases lowered the Treasury’s borrowing costs, especially during the 
Second World War.112 Changing its mind, the Treasury did not want to 
let go of this preferential financing arrangement when the War ended.113 
Concerned about rising inflation, the Fed wanted to increase interest 
rates.114 The Fed also wanted to avoid crowding out private market mak-
ers from dealing in Treasury securities.115 
Unrelated to its trading functions, Congress in 1946 gave the feder-
al government explicit responsibility for promoting adequate levels of 
employment.116 This mandate imposed contradictory obligations on the 
Fed, which would now have concurrent responsibilities to both control 
inflation and promote employment.117 The Fed would still be expected to 
promote price stability, accomplished through keeping inflation in check 
by making money “tight.”118 It would also promote economic growth, 
                                                     
 109. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 45. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has an excellent 
publication that explains how today’s FOMC works. See A Day in the Life of the FOMC, FED. RES. 
BANK OF PHIL. (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.philadelphiafed.org/education/teachers/resources/day-
in-life-of-fomc/. 
 110. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 48. 
 111. 1 JANE W. D’ARISTA, THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. FINANCE, 122–23 (1994) (noting Treasury 
Secretary Mellon’s opposition to the Fed maintaining a large portfolio of government securities). 
 112. 2 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 299 (noting pressure from the Treasury and the President’s 
Council on Economic Advisers to tamp down the government’s borrowing costs) (“During World 
War II, Treasury officials decreed that interest rates would be kept at artificially low levels in order 
to reduce government funding costs.”). Although current rates are lower, the Fed and the Treasury 
succeeded in keeping rates down. Three-month rates averaged 0.37% and long-term bonds averaged 
2.3%. Id. at 261. 
 113. Id. at 299. Professor Markham suggests that the Fed’s poor management of the Great 
Depression made it easier for the Treasury to interfere in monetary policy. 
 114. Id. 
 115. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 52. The Fed pursued independence from the Treasury because 
“the central idea was to support rebuilding of the dealer infrastructure of private capital markets.” Id. 
at 54. 
 116. The Employment Act of 1946 provides in pertinent part that “it is the continuing policy 
and responsibility of the Federal government to use all practicable means . . . to promote maximum 
employment, production, and purchasing power.” Employment Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-304, 60 
Stat. 23 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1021). 
 117. MARC LABONTE, CONG. RES. SERV., R 41656, CHANGING THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S 
MANDATE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 2 (Mar. 13, 2012) (analyzing the policy and economic perfor-
mance implications of serving mandate by targeting inflation). 
 118. Raising interest rates tends to slow down the growth of the economy by limiting discre-
tionary spending that is sensitive to interest rates. LABONTE, supra note 16, at 5. 
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making money “loose” as needed to encourage spending.119 How, exact-
ly, the Fed was expected to serve God and Mammon was never made 
clear because tight and loose money represent antagonistic policies.120 
The Fed’s conflicts with the political branches began to take root during 
this period.121 
D. Independence (1951–2007) 
Until well after the Second World War, the Fed had been a chimera 
with disparate elements held together by political horse trading.122 Only 
in 1951 would these elements quicken into a central bank through the 
Treasury–Federal Reserve Accord.123 This is not to suggest that wran-
gling with the political branches abated—quite the contrary.124 It did 
                                                     
 119. Id. 
 120. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 4–8 (presenting core Keynesian assumptions and the mone-
tarist critique). During the 1970s, the U.S. economy suffered from high rates of both inflation and 
unemployment. In this environment, Congress helped usher the Fed into the age of impossible ex-
pectations by passing the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978. Emerson, supra note 
17, at 118–19. Expanding on the policies set down by the Employment Act of 1946, the 1978 law 
charged the Fed with promoting three goals: “maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate 
long-term interest rates.” Federal Reserve Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-188, 91 Stat. 1387 (codified 
at 12 U.S.C. § 225(a), § 2A). The entire mandate reads as follows: 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market 
Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregate com-
mensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase production, so as to promote 
effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term in-
terest rates. 
 121. In 1948, President Truman pushed Chairman Marriner Eccles out of the chairmanship—
but not the board—after he tried unsuccessfully to increase reserve requirements, which would have 
tightened the money supply. TODD, supra note 66, 27–28. 
 122. The contradictions reflected legislative compromises: 
The Federal Reserve began operations in 1914 as a peculiar hybrid, a partly public, partly 
private institution, intended to be independent of political influence with principal offic-
ers of the government on its supervisory board, endowed with central banking functions, 
but not a central bank. 
1 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 725–26. During this period, Chairman William McChesney Martin 
gave the Fed its contemporary shape, further increasing the power of the board over the FRBNY, 
resulting in a more cohesive structure. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 35; see also id. at 43 (“The 
structure of the modern Federal Reserve is, in large part, Martin’s creation.”). 
 123. 2 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 300. 
 124. During the 1950s, proposals from congressmen to change the Fed kept coming, although 
few prospered. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 224. East Texan Representative Wright Patman saw 
the Fed as in cahoots with banks to keep interest rates high so as to exploit borrowers, especially 
farmers. TODD, supra note 66, at 35. So he peppered the Fed with requests for information and tried 
to bring it under tighter congressional control. Id. Presidents also pushed their preferences about 
monetary policy. Despite pressure from President Truman to keep long-term interest rates to 2.5%, 
the Treasury and the Fed agreed in 1951 that it would decide on monetary policy without interfer-
ence by the Treasury. Id. at 33. Angered by the Fed’s decision to increase interest rates in 1965, 
Lyndon B. Johnson tried unsuccessfully to push out Chairman William McChesney Martin. Id. at 
37–38. 
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mean that the Fed’s decisions about monetary policy would no longer 
have to take into account the borrowing preferences of the Treasury. The 
Fed could instead raise rates immediately.125 
Vindicating the prescience of Benjamin Strong, open-market opera-
tions had come to replace the discount window as the key tool of credit 
policy.126 Concerned that it might be pressured to support longer-term 
borrowing by the Treasury (“quantitative easing” in today’s euphe-
misms), the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) voted to concen-
trate its portfolio on the short end of the yield curve.127 It became known 
as the “bills only” doctrine.128 Focusing on short-term debt—mostly 
Treasury bills—meant that making markets for longer term securities 
would be left to private firms.129 
During the 1960 presidential campaign, Democrats criticized the 
bills only doctrine because they saw it as an obstacle to lower long-term 
rates, thought to be capable of stimulating spending.130 Nudged by Presi-
dent Kennedy, the Fed began to invest in longer-term Treasury securi-
ties.131 The theory was that the Fed could directly influence long-term 
interest rates as well as short-term ones, a policy to which we have re-
turned today.132 Called Operation Twist after the dance of its day, it 
would consist of the Fed extending the term of its Treasury portfolio by 
selling short-term securities and buying long-term ones.133 
One of the more controversial decisions of the Fed during this peri-
od was to start dealing in foreign exchange.134 Again, the push for this 
came from the Kennedy Administration.135 The Fed disagreed internally 
about whether it had authority for these trades, with some preferring that 
Congress pass enabling legislation to do so.136 By a majority vote of the 
                                                     
 125. 2 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 299. 
 126. 1 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 744. 
 127. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 35 (“To free itself from pressures to support the market for 
long-term debt, the Federal Reserve adopted a bills-only policy.”); see also id. at 59 (describing the 
terms of the FOMC’s unanimous vote in favor of the bills only policy). 
 128. By affecting the amount of liquidity that dealers could get through repurchase agreements, 
the Fed’s actions in the short-term money market would have an indirect influence on the price of 
long-term assets. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 102. 
 129. Id. at 54 (“Thenceforth the Fed would maintain orderly conditions at the short end, and 
rely on arbitrage and private dealers to bring orderly conditions to the long end.”). 
 130. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 315–16. 
 131. Id. at 316. 
 132. Id. at 317 (discussing Heller’s memorandum to Kennedy asserting that the Fed could 
influence long term rates). 
 133. Titan Alon & Eric Swanson, Operation Twist and the Effect of Large-Scale Asset Pur-
chases, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO ECONOMIC LETTER (2011) (comparing the 
original Operation Twist with quantitative easing). 
 134. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 348–58. 
 135. Id. at 348 (citing objections of Congressmen Reuss, Multer, and Patman). 
 136. Id. at 350. 
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Board, though, the Fed decided to authorize these foreign currency trades 
under its authorities to buy cable transfers, which involve claims to for-
eign exchange.137 Nevertheless, several congressmen accused the Fed of 
exceeding its statutory authorities.138 
In 1966, Congress further expanded the Fed’s authority over open-
market operations by letting it buy and sell the direct obligations of any 
government agency.139 The same year, the FOMC adopted a trading mo-
dality that would become a stable transaction—reverse repurchase 
agreements.140 These agreements let the Fed absorb banks’ excess re-
serves by entering into short-term loans collateralized by Treasury debt 
from the Fed’s portfolio.141 Fed staff objected that because this amounted 
to a cash loan by a bank to the Fed, it might not be legal, and it might 
cast doubt about the Fed’s own solvency.142 In the end, the FOMC ap-
proved the technique, which has gone on to become a staple of the Fed’s 
market-making activities.143 
Skirmishes continued between the Fed and the political branches.144 
To not overstate my argument, let me note that Congress narrowed the 
Fed’s freedom of action at least once: the Federal Reserve Reform Act of 
                                                     
 137. Id. at 352 (citing objections of Congressmen Reuss, Multer, and Patman); id. at 349. 
 138. Id. at 348 (citing objections of Congressmen Reuss, Multer, and Patman). 
 139. Id. at 661. 
 140. Id. at 464. In an ordinary repurchase transaction, the Fed made liquidity available to a 
bank by buying some of its Treasury securities and simultaneously entering into a future sale of 
those same securities back to the bank. By adjusting the original purchase price and repurchase 
price, the Fed could arrive at a notional rate of interest to be paid by the bank. A reverse repo fol-
lowed the same mechanics but served the opposite policy of provisionally shifting some liquidity 
from the private banking system onto the Fed’s balance sheet. Id. at 464. Again, the price difference 
between the two offsetting trades would establish a notional rate of interest, but this time it would be 
on a hypothetical loan from the bank to the Fed. Id. 
 141. PARKER B. WILLIS, THE FEDERAL FUNDS MARKET: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 27 
(1970) (describing use of “matched sale-purchase-contract” to absorb bank reserves). 
 142. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 464. 
 143. Indeed, reverse repurchase agreements are one of the main ways that the Fed may use to 
pull back drain inflationary liquidity. Deborah Levine, Fed Says Testing Reverse Repos for Future 
Use, MARKET WATCH (Oct. 19, 2009) (noting that Fed officials have discussed using reverse repo to 
offset monetary easing). 
 144. In 1978, Jimmy Carter coaxed William Miller out of the chairmanship position after only 
one year by making him Secretary of the Treasury. TODD, supra note 66, at 40–41. In 1988, Alan 
Greenspan complained before Congress about a Reagan official’s attempt to influence the delibera-
tions of the FOMC. See TODD, supra note 84, at 3; see also Art Pine, Greenspan Discloses Attempt 
to Prod Fed to Ease Policy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1988. In 1986, Senator John Melcher unsuccessful-
ly sued the Fed in district court arguing that appointing presidents of the regional Federal Reserve 
banks without congressional approval violated the Constitution. TODD, supra note 66, at 47–48. In 
1988, another Texas congressman, Henry Gonzalez, used his chairmanship of the House Banking 
Committee to urge the Fed to disclose more about what it does. Id. at 49–50. Rep. Lee Hamilton 
introduced a bill in 1989 to put the Secretary of the Treasury on the Fed Board again. Id. at 49. In 
1991, Senator Paul Sarbanes proposed a bill that would have kept the presidents of the regional 
Federal Reserve banks from voting on the FOMC. Id. 
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1977 required the Fed to report to Congress on a variety of policy mat-
ters.145 The trend line is clear though—alluvial growth of trading authori-
ty by statutory enactment and expansive statutory construction by the 
Fed. For example, in 1980 Congress gave the Fed authority to conduct 
open-market operations with foreign public debt.146 
A particularly important expansion of the Fed’s emergency liquidi-
ty powers came in 1991. That year, Congress reformed the federal gov-
ernment’s mechanism for resolving failed and failing banks with the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act.147 The goal was to limit the federal gov-
ernment’s exposure to financial risk from failing banks, sometimes mag-
nified by discount window lending.148 When it came to the Fed’s emer-
gency powers under section 13(3), however, the statute went in the oppo-
site direction by expanding the kind of collateral that the Fed could ac-
cept.149 It would presage the emergency liquidity efforts of 2008. 
Since the Fed’s founding, nonbank firms had had little practical ac-
cess to the Fed’s emergency credit because they tended not to have the 
kinds of assets that qualified as eligible collateral, first for the discount 
window and then for emergency lending under section 13(3). Much as 
the Panic of 1907 had encouraged Congress to revisit the issue of a cen-
tral bank, the stock market crash of October 1987 persuaded Congress 
that the Fed’s emergency liquidity powers should be broadened so that it 
could lend to a wider set of actors that could pledge different kinds of 
collateral.150 Although not framed in so many words, this was an implicit 
recognition of an incipient shadow banking sector. 
Congress accomplished this objective by striking the language in 
section 13(3) that had limited collateral to the kinds of assets that were 
already eligible for discount.151 The practical effect of this change was to 
                                                     
 145. Emerson, supra note 17, at note 49 (conceding that the Federal Reserve Reform Act is a 
rare exception to the trend of expansion of authorities). 
 146. Depository Institutions Deregulations and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
221. 
 147. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102242, 
105 Stat. 2236; see also M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RES. SERV., FDIC IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 
1991 (PUB. L. 102242): A SUMMARY (1992). 
 148. Walker F. Todd, FDICIA’s Discount Window Provisions, ECON. COMMENT., Dec. 15, 
1992, at 16 (“Congress felt compelled to address discount window administration in FDIC1A be-
cause of its concern that, under certain circumstances, discount window advances to troubled institu-
tions could unnecessarily increase taxpayers” cost when the firms were eventually closed and liqui-
dated, or sold by the FDIC.”). 
 149. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 § 473; see also Todd, 
supra note 105, at 16–23. 
 150. Todd, supra note 105, at 22 (noting legislative history of collateral expansion). 
 151. What this means is that “FDICIA expanded emergency discount window access for non-
banks of all types, not merely securities firms, because any satisfactory assets (not just marketable 
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allow nonbank lenders and other kinds of entities to borrow under sec-
tion 13(3), making this the Fed’s most expansive permanent discount. 
This authority would lay dormant until used to help Bear Stearns (an in-
vestment bank) in 2008. Ironically, the sponsor of the 1991 collateral 
expansion was Senator Christopher Dodd, later responsible for the 
Dodd–Frank Act, which would go on to abridge this authority.152 
Congress increased the Fed’s emergency lending authority again af-
ter September 11, 2001. Since its enactment during the Depression, the 
authority under section 13(3) had required a majority vote based on a 
quorum of five Fed Governors. Aware that some crises called for agility, 
Congress in 2002 lowered the quorum from five to two and required that 
all available Governors agree unanimously on the need for this kind of 
authority.153 In this situation, a written determination by the participating 
Governors would be needed, later transmitted to the Chairmen of the 
Senate Committee on Banking and the House Committee on Financial 
Services.154 
When archeologist Heinrich Schliemann excavated Troy, what he 
found was seven different cities, one on top of each other.155 The Fed’s 
roles were similarly layered—it was at first a banker’s bank, and then a 
market maker, and finally it became a trustee for Congress’s impossible 
expectations imposed in a mixed mandate over both inflation and em-
ployment. Market exigencies were about to create a new Fed. 
                                                                                                   
securities, for example) may be pledged to secure the borrower’s own note.” Todd, supra note 148, 
at 18. 
 152. Todd, supra note 105, at 20 (1993) (quoting Sen. Dodd from the Congressional Record). 
 153. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 301, 116 Stat. 2340 
(amending the Federal Reserve Act and adding § 11(r), 12 U.S.C. §248(r)). That same year, the Fed 
also adopted a regulation clarifying how credit under section 13(3) was to be extended: 
Emergency credit for others. In unusual and exigent circumstances and after consultation 
with the Board of Governors, a Federal Reserve Bank may extend credit to an individual, 
partnership, or corporation that is not a depository institution if, in the judgment of the 
Federal Reserve Bank, credit is not available from other sources and failure to obtain 
such credit would adversely affect the economy. If the collateral used to secure emergen-
cy credit consists of assets other than obligations of, or fully guaranteed as to principal 
and interest by, the United States or an agency thereof, credit must be in the form of a 
discount and five or more members of the Board of Governors must affirmatively vote to 
authorize the discount prior to the extension of credit. Emergency credit will be extended 
at a rate above the highest rate in effect for advances to depository institutions. 
67 Fed. Reg. 67,786 (Nov. 7, 2002). 
 154. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 301. 
 155. SUSAN HEUCK ALLEN, FINDING THE WALLS OF TROY: FRANK CALVERT AND HEINRICH 
SCHLIEMANN AT HISARLÍK 147 (1999). 
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III. FINANCIAL HOSPITALS: AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR THE FED 
As the opening hypothetical from Part I shows, lenders are ex-
pected to borrow short and lend long.156 This works so long as funding 
markets let them refinance. From the perspective of stewarding funding 
markets, the crisis became acute when lenders could not roll over their 
short-term debt. This was when the Fed morphed into a market maker of 
last resort.157 Section A sets up the crisis by explaining how the rise of 
new funding products and nonbank lenders had changed the Fed’s theater 
of operations. Since the Fed’s establishment, a shift had occurred to-
wards “capital market-based finance” and away from traditional lenders 
like banks.158 This was not entirely a surprise, after all, because Con-
gress’s expansion in 1991 of collateral eligibility for section 13(3) had 
nodded to these trends. 
Accordingly, between March and December 2008, the Fed expand-
ed its secured lending to nonbank firms and funding vehicles, which 
were allowed to post a wide range of collateral.159 The expansion operat-
ed on two liquidity tracks—limited-liability companies linked to particu-
lar firms, and programs that directed support to particular asset classes or 
intermediaries. Section B examines the limited-liability companies, 
called “Maiden Lane” after the street address of the NYFRB. Section C 
examines the programs. 
A. Interbank Funding 
Beginning late in the twentieth century, funding markets had un-
dergone important changes, with important implications for both the as-
set-side and the liability-side of lender balance sheets. First, on the asset-
side, banks had begun to face competition from nonbank lenders in the 
                                                     
 156. “A classic function of banking [is] . . . increasing the supply of long-term and fixed-rate 
credit available to borrowers, which a bank can do by borrowing at shorter terms and at both fixed 
and floating terms and then professionally managing the risks of term and rate mismatches on its 
balance sheet.” Gabilondo, supra note 22, at 265 & n.38. 
 157. An analysis by the Congressional Research Service lists twenty-six potential causes of the 
2007 financial crisis. MARK JICKLING, CONG. RES. SERV., R 40173, CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS (Apr. 9, 2010). The Fed has direct or indirect responsibility for half of them, e.g., housing 
bubble, shadow banking, failure of bank risk management systems, Community Reinvestment Act, 
and systemic risk. Id. at 5–10. 
 158. State Street, Securities Lending, Liquidity, and Capital Market-Based Finance, in 
SECURITIES FINANCE: SECURITIES LENDING AND REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS 40 (Frank J. Fabozzi 
and Steven V. Mann eds., 2005) (“Capital markets in [the United States and the United Kingdom] 
have, in fact, replaced banks as the dominant source of corporate finance.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Isabella Kaminska, A Tale of Two Collateral Markets, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 19, 
2011), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2011/12/19/793211/a-tale-of-two-collateral-markets/. 
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“shadow banking” sector.160 These shadow banks included securities 
firms, hedge funds, money market mutual funds, and special purpose 
vehicles designed to raise funds.161 Bank-dominated lending had given 
way to markets in which banks, nonbank financial institutions, and other 
firms originated and traded credit. Not subject to regulation as depository 
institutions, these nonbank firms lacked access to the Fed’s last resort 
funding. 
Second, the funding model for lenders—addressing the liability-
side of the balance sheet—had changed. Demand deposits—a traditional 
source of lendable funds—decreased as customers moved their funds 
into other types of financial institutions.162 Around 1961, commercial 
banks had begun to issue large certificates of deposit.163 As part of this 
process, banks looked for substitute funding not only from securitization 
but also from other wholesale lenders and financial markets.164 In effect, 
both depository institutions and other lenders had adopted a new funding 
model to serve their traditional roles. 
For example, money market mutual funds had become the single 
largest investor of commercial paper, used by firms to finance their 
short-term credit needs.165 Often this meant using a limited-liability com-
pany. For example, a company set up to issue asset-backed commercial 
paper would issue short-term commercial paper collateralized by asset-
backed securities created from long-term mortgages.166 This arrangement 
solved the classic funding challenge faced by lenders of borrowing short 
(through commercial paper) and lending long (through the underlying 
mortgages), but it worked only if the commercial paper could be re-
financed upon maturity at the same interest rate. 
                                                     
 160. POZSAR ET AL., supra note 21, at 1 (“Over the past decade, the shadow banking system 
provided sources of funding for credit by converting opaque, risky, long-term assets into money-like, 
short-term liabilities.”). 
 161. Id. 
 162. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, LIQUIDITY: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 1–2 (2012) 
(discussing risk implications to banks of shrinking deposit base). 
 163. Rob J.M. Willemse, Large Certificates of Deposit, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY 
MARKET, supra note 56, at 39. 
 164. STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LISSA LAMKIN BROOME, 
SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS 1–3 (2004) (tracing the growth of 
securitization from the 1970s). 
 165. Adrian et al., The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility, FRBNY ECON. 
POL’Y REV., May 2011, at 25, 28, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/ 
11v17n1/1105adri.pdf; see also Timothy Q. Cook & Jeremy G. Duffield, Money Market Mutual 
Funds and Other Short-Term Investment Pools, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET, supra 
note 56, at 156, 157 (discussing the growth of money market mutual funds since 1972). 
 166. Adrian et al., supra note 165, at 26. 
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Funding came to be understood as an “interbank” phenomenon, 
with new opportunities and risks.167 In the old world of a deposit-funded 
loan held to maturity, a liquidity panic would have started when deposi-
tors made a run on a bank’s deposits.168 Federal deposit insurance miti-
gated the risk of a panic, but in the unlikely event of one nonetheless the 
lender-of-last-resort function would come into play; the solvent but illiq-
uid bank could borrow from the Fed on eligible collateral until the panic 
passed. In a world of nonbank lenders and fickle trading markets, though, 
stabilizing a run was more complicated.169 One wholesale lender’s risk 
assessment of a borrower could cause a panic if other lenders followed 
suit.170 Moreover, the secondary market for credit made it easy for price 
signals to travel anonymously and quickly. So it was not enough to wor-
ry about a firm’s liquidity—the whole markets mattered now. 
As suggested by Part I, lender funding had been the Fed’s problem 
since its establishment.171 Not only did these markets promote bank li-
quidity, they were also where the Fed pursued monetary policy, expect-
ing that changing bank reserves would influence the credit supply and 
longer-term interest rates.172 In particular, the Fed had stewarded the 
money market.173 This included participating in markets for commercial 
paper,174 bankers’ acceptances,175 and the call-loan market, where inves-
                                                     
 167. Not surprisingly, new risk management products developed. In 1968, short-term interest-
rate futures entered the market. Anatoli Kuprianov, Short-Term Interest Rate Futures, in 
INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET, supra note 56, at 168–69. The following year, options on 
short-term interest rate futures followed. Id. at 193–206. 
 168. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo 1 (Yale Int’l 
Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper 09-14, Nov. 9, 2010) (“A traditional-banking run is driven by the with-
drawal of deposits, while a securitized-banking run is driven by the withdrawal of repurchase (“re-
po”) agreements.”). 
 169. These were the risks that the last crisis put on display: 
A bank’s reliance on the financial markets for funding, however, can also increase the 
level, uncertainty, and complexity of a bank’s liquidity risk profile . . . funding from fi-
nancial markets also exposes a bank to heightened systemic liquidity risk [due to] the 
volatility of global and domestic funds supply and demand, unexpected disruptions in 
normal market trading and pricing, settlement and operational interruptions, and pro-
nounced adjustments in a market’s risk pricing and acceptance. 
Id. at 18. 
 170. Id. (arguing that “securitized banking” funded by repurchase agreements came to substi-
tute for “traditional banking” funded by deposits). 
 171. See supra notes 78–83, 94–102. 
 172. Craig Furfine, The Interbank Market During a Crisis 1 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Work-
ing Paper No. 99, 2001) (“[I]t is in [interbank] markets that central banks actively intervene to guide 
their policy interest rates.”). 
 173. Historically, we divide financial markets into a money market with instruments of one 
year or less and a capital market with instruments of longer than one year. See generally 
INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET, supra note 56. 
 174. David L. Mengle, The Discount Window, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET, 
supra note 56, at 23, 31. 
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tors borrowed money from stock brokers to purchase stock on margin.176 
When the Treasury began offering short-term Treasury bills in 1929, the 
Fed’s open-market operations supported their liquidity.177 The Fed also 
supported self-sustaining money markets where banks could fund them-
selves. One example was the federal funds market, a trading mechanism 
that let banks with excess reserves sell them to banks in need of re-
serves.178 
The Fed had also contributed to the repurchase (repo) sector, which 
would assume primordial importance in the interbank funding model.179 
During the 1950s, private dealers had begun financing their inventories 
of Treasury debt through repo agreements in which the seller of the secu-
rity promised to buy it back.180 Though structured as back-to-back pur-
chases, these transactions were, in effect, secured loans using Treasury 
debt as collateral. Repo let firms get cheap credit by pledging Treasuries 
as collateral for short-term cash loans, reducing both the firm’s cost of 
holding Treasuries and the federal government’s cost of issuing them.181 
The borrowed cash could be profitably reinvested before repayment. 
                                                                                                   
 175. Eric Hill, Bankers Acceptances, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET, supra note 56, 
at 126, 132. 
 176. Both the U.S. government and foreign governments began to borrow heavily during 
World War I, however, making it harder for brokers to fund their margin loans to customers. 2 
MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 80. To respond to the concern that shortages of short-term call money 
would disrupt both the stock market and the Treasury’s own market for government securities, a 
Money Committee was formed with the FRBNY chief and New York banking officials. Id. at 80–81. 
The Committee dissolved itself after two years, but it presaged the Fed’s future role in regulating 
margin credit. Id. Margin credit contributed importantly to the speculation leading to the Great 
Crash. See id. at 150 (noting that banks could borrow from the Fed at 3.5% and relend in the call 
money market at 10%). 
 177. Timothy Q. Cook, Treasury Bills, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET, supra note 
56, at 81; see also Garbade, supra note 6. 
 178. WILLIS, supra note 141, at 4. Before its rise, banks short of cash could finance their re-
serve requirement through the Fed’s discount window, but banks wanted other ways to manage their 
reserves. Some banks had excess reserves looking for investment. In the early 1920s, banks realized 
that they could trade these excess reserves, giving banks short on reserves an option to the discount 
window. Id. Initially, the Fed did not encourage the funds market because it deprived the Fed of 
information about the financial condition of banks, as reflected in the factors that influence their 
reserve position. Id. at 5. The market took off nonetheless. It would become one of the central ways 
that the Fed conducted monetary policy. 
 179. Stephen A. Lumpkin, Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Agreements, in INSTRUMENTS 
OF THE MONEY MARKET, supra note 56, at 65, 73–74. 
 180. WILLIS, supra note 141, at 22–24. 
 181. Formally, the deal includes a pair of offsetting contracts—for example, a spot agreement 
to sell a security matched by a forward agreement to buy back the security. It is in substance a col-
lateralized loan. 
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Broker-dealers relied on this kind of overnight funding more than com-
mercial banks did.182 
Developments in repo were symptomatic of what was happening in 
the funding market in general. A repo bubble had developed, as the mar-
ket increased seven-fold since 1994.183 Although repo had tended to be 
confined to government securities, collateral markets now developed for 
repoing other kinds of assets too.184 Moreover, the percentage of over-
night deals had increased, shortening the average term of these deals.185 
These developments had weakened the Fed’s grip on its policy role 
because funding was taking place in markets in which the Fed neither 
discounted nor traded. Though the locus of funding had changed, it still 
mattered for the same reasons. For example, the imminence of funding 
transactions made them important as liquidity signals—if a firm could 
not pay its overnight debt, its long-term solvency was in peril.186 Price 
moves in interbank deals could also first reflect more permanent differ-
ences in the trading value of credit assets.187 It was a critical node, then, 
one that could send early warnings about the financial sector. Because it 
involves direct financial links (both on and off the balance sheet) be-
tween financial firms, it could signal systemic risk.188 So it was natural 
that the Fed would take an interest in the growing influence of interbank 
mechanisms. 
                                                     
 182. See Adrian et al., The Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility, 15 CURRENT 
ISSUES ECON. & FIN., no. 4, 2009, at 1–10, 2 (finding that repo deals for 2007 made up 38% of the 
short-term liabilities of broker-dealers but only 10% of those for commercial banks). 
 183. Id. at 2 (noting that the market increased from $450 billion to $3 trillion). 
 184. See Adrian et al., supra note 182, at 2 (noting a variety of financial instruments financed 
by repurchase arrangements). 
 185. See id. at 3 (noting that the proportion of overnight deals increased from 50% to 75% of 
overall market). 
 186. As Perry Mehrling points out: 
It is in the daily operation of the money market that the coherence of the credit system, 
that vast web of promises to pay, is tested and resolved as cash flows meet cash commit-
ments. The web of interlocking debt commitments, each one a more or less rash promise 
about an uncertain future, is like a bridge that we collectively spin out into the unknown 
future towards shores not yet visible. 
MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 187. Even small changes in the estimates of this risk—as measured by the terms that overnight 
lenders impose—may be significant indicators of how the market is seeing an instrument’s long-
term prospects. 
 188. Christian Upper, Using Counterfactual Simulations to Assess the Danger of Contagion in 
Interbank Markets (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 234, 2007) (examining the role of 
interbank links in spreading financial contagion). Risk can be expressed in terms of the proportion of 
a bank’s assets that consist of loans to other banks. Id. at 2. Bank regulators pay special attention to 
accounts that banks have with other banks. See also COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK ON DUE FROM BANKS (1998) (providing analysis and examination 
procedures for bank deposits in other banks). 
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The scope of the interbank market, however, was no longer clear.189 
In its narrowest sense, it meant only credit exposures between federally 
insured depository institutions, namely, banks.190 It could also include the 
discount window, federal funds, and repurchase agreements.191 
Given the rise of nonbank lenders and funding vehicles, we should 
define the interbank sector broadly, capturing any mechanism used to 
shift or transfer short-term credit risk between financial firms.192 This 
would incorporate the trader’s sense that the interbank sector refers to a 
variety of secured and unsecured credit—both term and overnight—used 
by financial firms other than depositary institutions.193 A broad definition 
would also include swaps, options, futures, and money market mutual 
funds insofar as they relate to the debt of a lender.194 As academics 
                                                     
 189. A broader definition makes sense because it is not clear anymore what counts as a “bank.” 
It is not only banks that intermediate maturity but also other firms and financing vehicles. This idea 
draws on John Maynard Keynes’s notion from the 1930s about the priority of the financial sector, 
Hyman Minsky’s work from the 1980s on financial instability, and Ben Bernanke’s efforts to study 
the “financial accelerator.” See Gabilondo, supra note 9, at 447; see also supra notes 125–39. 
Bernanke is widely understood to favor central bank support during a credit crisis, but this idea rests 
largely on the premise that the financial sector is a crucial part of the economy, an insight not appre-
ciated during the Depression. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 44. 
 190. See 12 C.F.R. § 206 (2003). Sometimes even more narrowly it refers to unsecured lending 
between banks. Joao F. Cocco et al., Lending Relationships in the Interbank Market, 18 J. FIN. 
INTERMEDIATION 24 (2007), available at http://faculty.london.edu/fgomes/cgmart.pdf. 
 191. Repurchase agreements also provide central banks with a mechanism to influence the 
credit supply and with information about major financial institutions. COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. 
SYS. OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GRP. OF TEN COUNTRIES, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
PUB. NO. 10, IMPLICATIONS OF REPO MARKETS FOR CENTRAL BANKS 1 (1999) (“Repos are useful to 
central banks both as a monetary policy instrument and as a source of information on market expec-
tations.”). 
 192. You can see securitization as a way of externalizing what would otherwise count as inter-
bank claims, say through whole-loan exposures to other financial intermediaries. A functional defini-
tion of interbank funding should, therefore, recognize the economic similarity between an explicit 
interbank asset (like a loan to another financial firm) and a bank’s ongoing exposure to securitized 
assets that can morph into de facto interbank assets. Take the purchaser of an asset-backed tranche 
from a special-purpose vehicle. Assuming that a true sale has occurred, the purchaser has no ongoing 
relationship to the vehicle’s sponsor or the originator of the receivables purchased by the vehicle. 
But if the purchaser later ends up with a claim against the sponsor or originator through moral re-
course or to a third party that has provided some kind of liquidity backing, then some new de facto 
interbank relationships have been created from the purchaser to these other parties. This might hap-
pen if the bank is providing a liquidity guarantee to an asset-backed commercial paper conduit or a 
structured-investment vehicle, both of which proliferated during the bubble. Xavier Freixas, Antoine 
Martin & David Skele, Bank Liquidity, Interbank Markets, and Monetary Policy (Eur. Banking Ctr. 
Discussion, Working Paper No. 2010-08S, 2010) (pointing out the contingent liquidity risk of banks 
that had issued liquidity guarantees). 
 193. In Europe, the Wholesale Markets Brokers Associations promotes indices to track inter-
bank lending. See WHOLESALE MARKETS BROKERS’ ASS’N, http://www.wmba.org.uk/pages/in 
dex.cfm (last visited July 4, 2012). 
 194. See Felix Salmon, Money Markets Are the New Interbank Markets, REUTERS BLOG (June 
27, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2012/06/27/money-markets-are-the-new-interbank-
markets/. For example, rates on the overnight indexed swap (OIS) are often used as a benchmark to 
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mulled over these admittedly intriguing questions, the Fed was beginning 
to face the prospect of major organ failure in the financial system.195 In 
the end, the Fed would sweep up new sectors of the interbank market 
through the financial hospitals analyzed in sections B and C. 
The liquidity predicate for the crisis had started during the Green-
span years, when loose money fed a credit bubble.196 This would begin to 
change in July 2007 as indicators suggested rising credit risk.197 Worsen-
ing during the summer, that August a French bank stopped redeeming 
some of its funds after concluding that it could not value some securities 
backed up by U.S. subprime mortgages.198 Soon the overnight rate that 
London banks paid for uncollateralized funds—the London Inter-Bank 
Offer Rate (LIBOR)—began to increase, rising substantially in compari-
son with its U.S. cousin, the federal funds rate.199 Borrowers in the 
LIBOR market are viewed as having sterling credit, so it was noteworthy 
when the market expressed increasing concern about these borrowers’ 
creditworthiness.200 
                                                                                                   
evaluate rates on repo deals. Hördahl & King, supra note 35, at 42. The OIS contract is a variation of 
the “vanilla” fixed-for-floating swap. A fixed-rate payer receives the average of overnight rates 
during the term of the swap. Id. at 37. Net settlement happens at the end of the swap. Id. 
 195. These are economic models that evolve based on new economic theory. Mark 
Whitehouse, Crisis Compels Economists to Reach for New Paradigm, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2009, at 
1 (examining Yale economist John Geanakoplos’s work on how collateral markets impact leverage 
cycles). Central bank researchers have already begun to consider this issue. For example, in 2001, 
the Bank for International Settlements published a study examining the role of central banks in col-
lateral markets. WORKING GRP. ON COLLATERAL, COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., BANK FOR 
INT’L SETTLEMENTS, PUB. NO. 17, COLLATERAL IN WHOLESALE FINANCIAL MARKETS: RECENT 
TRENDS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND MARKET DYNAMICS (2001), available at http://www.bis.org/ 
publ/cgfs17.htm. The study was precipitated by the fear—ironic today—that budget surpluses in the 
United States and other borrower nations would lead to a shortage in government debt collateral. Id. 
at 12. The report noted that central banks had little effect on the private collateral market because 
central bank lending was small relative to the overall debt market, although private parties might 
prefer to hold collateral deemed by a central bank to be eligible for secured lending by it. Id. at 17. 
 196. Alan Greenspan served as chair of the Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006. At the time, he 
was seen as having contributed to great prosperity, although, in hindsight, some see many of the 
economic gains from that time as illusory. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 50–66. Initially, Bernanke kept 
Greenspan’s monetary policies. Id. at 84 (“Greenspan had been steadily raising the Fed’s key interest 
rate for years; Bernanke continued to do so and indeed left many of his predecessor’s monetary 
policies untouched.”) The stock market would keep rising until October 2007, when the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average broke 14,000 for the first time. Id. at 92. 
 197. Stephen G. Cecchetti, Crisis and Response: The Federal Reserve in the Early Stages of 
the Financial Crisis, 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 51, 57 (2009) (noting that spreads on certain credit 
products had begun to widen). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 57–59 (noting that usual ten basis point spread between LIBOR and Fed funds wid-
ened to between 25 and 106 basis points through the fall of 2007). 
 200. The LIBOR was rocked by its first major scandal in July 2012 when Barclay’s admitted 
that it had deliberately underestimated its borrowing costs. 
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By mid-2007, the repo sector began to show signs of these stress-
es.201 Lenders had become willing to make only shorter term loans.202 
This meant that borrowers had to refinance more frequently.203 Corporate 
debt and structured finance products could no longer be financed by repo 
as lenders sought higher quality collateral.204 Moreover, an increasing 
number of lenders were refusing to return their collateral, meaning that 
the second leg of the paired transaction—the original purchase and the 
subsequent repurchase—did not occur, leading to settlement failures.205 
Banks could borrow longer than overnight, but only with collateral, 
which increased demand for Treasury securities.206 By March 2008, the 
par value outstanding of securities that were being used as collateral 
shrank from $4.5 trillion to $2.5 trillion.207 These were unsettling trends. 
This time, the challenge facing the Fed—too much integration of 
financial markets—was the opposite of the fragmented commercial paper 
market from the previous century.208 Textbook Bagehot, the Fed went 
into the lender-of-last-resort mode, opening the liquidity floodgates to 
banks with traditional collateral eligible for emergency lending. The Fed 
started with its traditional tools—lowering the discount rate and the fed-
eral-funds target.209 Cutting the discount rate by 0.5%—a large move—
temporarily reduced pressure.210 This rate would eventually drop from 
5.25% in August 2007 to zero, leaving the Fed with none of its tradition-
al options for increasing the credit supply.211 
The Fed also made it easier for banks to get traditional funding by 
extending the term of discount window lending and letting banks pledge 
a wider range of collateral.212 It was a cautious step towards acting as a 
                                                     
 201. Cecchetti, supra note 197, at 51–75, 61–62 (noting that the repo rate fell). 
 202. Hördahl & King, supra note 35, at 37 (“Despite the presence of collateral, repo markets 
were quickly affected by the turmoil . . . repo transactions were increasingly restricted to short ma-
turities and against only the highest-quality securities.”). 
 203. Id. at 43. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 37, 46. 
 206. Krishna Guha, Fed’s Eyes Foray into Unsecured Loans, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008 (analyz-
ing Fed’s options in the nonbank interbank market). 
 207. See Adrian et al., supra note 182, at 2. 
 208. See id at 5. 
 209. Johnson, supra note 1, at 7; see supra note 14 (discussing the six major activities that 
Johnson identifies). 
 210. Saskia Scholtes & Joanna Chung, Many Question Fed’s Move, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2007 
(“Initial reactions to these cuts have been positive, say traders, but they caution that conditions re-
main far from normal.”). 
 211. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 242–47 (describing the dilemma caused in a zero interest rate 
policy—”ZIRP”—environment). 
 212. The Term Discount Window Program and the Term Auction Facility extended the term of 
some discount window lending and broadened the kinds of securities that commercial banks could 
post as collateral for loans. Johnson, supra note 1, at 10–11; Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Federal 
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market maker of last resort, but it only benefitted banks—the Fed’s tradi-
tional liquidity clients.213 More radical steps would be needed to reach 
the shadow-banking sector, whose exact dimensions—hazy during the 
bubble—would emerge more clearly during the crash one deal at a time. 
The Fed was confronting the regulatory gap that had led to the 1991 re-
laxation of collateral requirements for emergency lending: markets 
would also have to be made on behalf of nonbank firms holding unortho-
dox collateral. Luckily, section 13(3) and its serial liberalization had put 
the Fed in a position to address this gap more actively than it had during 
the Depression.214 As a Fed governor quipped, “[t]he script was rewritten 
so that product innovation flowed, but this time from the public authori-
ties.”215 
B. Inpatient 
Using section 13(3), the Fed established three limited-liability 
companies to make a market for structured finance assets that had be-
come stranded on the balance sheets of Bear Stearns and AIG, two non-
bank firms. Once established, the Fed started trading out of its position. 
By June 2012, the Fed had been repaid in full with interest for all of its 
loans to these entities.216 Although consolidated on to the Fed’s balance 
sheet, each company was separately capitalized, so I discuss each in 
turn.217 
1. Maiden Lane I (Repurchase Markets) 
The first major sign (to financial markets and, indeed, to itself) that 
the Fed was broadening its market-making role was the deal done for 
                                                                                                   
Reserve and Other Central Banks Announce Measures Designed to Address Elevated Pressures in 
Short-Term Funding Markets (Dec. 12, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monet 
arypolicy/20071212a.htm. Short-term rates did lower after the announcement of the TAF and other 
measures, although it is not clear how much the TAF had to do with it. David C. Wheelock, Another 
Window: The Term Auction Facility, MONETARY TRENDS (Mar. 2008), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/ mt/20080301/cover.pdf. 
 213. Krishna Guha, Fed to Overhaul Provision of Market Liquidity, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007 
(noting the goal of the programs was “making dollar liquidity more readily available in both the 
onshore and offshore funding markets”); Krishna Guha, Fed Moves to Ensure There Is Enough for 
the New Year, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2007 (noting year-end demand of banks for liquidity). 
 214. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 40 (“The institution was still in its adolescence when it con-
fronted and failed its biggest test: misstep after misstep on the Fed’s part turned a bad late-1920s 
recession into the Great Depression.”). 
 215. Warsh, supra note 26. 
 216. Press Release, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., New York Fed Announces Full Repayment of its 
Loans to Maiden Lane LLC and Maiden Lane III LLC (June 14, 2012) (on file with author). 
 217. The Fed includes financial information about the Maiden Lane transactions in its weekly 
release of its own financial condition. H.4.1 Factors Affecting Reserve Balances, FED. RES., 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/ h41/current/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
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Bear Stearns, an investment bank beyond the charmed circle of the Fed’s 
liquidity clients.218 Bear’s financial problems had started in a sector that 
had attracted relatively little attention before the crisis—the repo market. 
Borrowing short and investing long during the repo bubble, Bear had 
been acting like a commercial bank, with one key difference—it lacked 
the liquidity safety net provided by the federal government to encourage 
banks to mismatch their assets and liabilities.219 For Bear, the music 
stopped in March 2008, when its secured-repo lenders refused to roll 
over their overnight loans.220 
It was now that the Fed turned to section 13(3). Because Congress 
had steadily broadened the kinds of collateral and firms that qualified for 
emergency assistance and relaxed the quorum requirement for action, the 
Board was able to act quickly.221 
To that end, it established a limited-liability company, Maiden 
Lane.222 The Fed lent to the vehicle, which purchased assets associated 
with Bear Stearns’ mortgage unit. Half of these assets were mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) guaranteed by government-sponsored enti-
ties.223 The other assets included whole mortgage loans (both commercial 
and residential) that were performing at the time of the purchase.224 The 
vehicle also bought swaps and forward contracts related to Bear’s mort-
gage business.225 By keeping Bear viable, Maiden Lane obviated the 
need for Bear’s collateralized lenders to sell their collateral, which would 
have further depressed prices in the interbank market.226 
                                                     
 218. In 1982, Federal Reserve official Jerry Corrigan identified three functional features that 
made banks “special,” in the sense that they justified their unique access to liquidity support from 
the government. E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, in FED (1983), available at 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=684. These three features 
were that banks provide transaction accounts for consumers and firms, that they stand ready to pro-
vide backup liquidity in moments of market crisis, and that the Federal Reserve uses the banks for 
monetary policy. Disintermediation away from depository institutions made other firms “special” 
too. 
 219. See Gabilondo, supra note 22, at 265–66 (adding maturity mismatch as an element to 
Jerry Corrigan’s model of what made banks special). 
 220. See Gabilondo, supra note 9; supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra notes 147–51 and accompanying text. 
 222. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York has established a website with comprehensive 
information about these transactions. Maiden Lane Transaction, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2012) 
 223. These MBS amounted to about $13 billion. Press Release, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Sum-
mary of Terms and Conditions Regarding the JPMorgan Chase Facility (Mar. 24, 2008). 
 224. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Annex II Portfolio Overview (itemizing composition of Maiden 
Lane), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2008/AnnexII.html. 
 225. Id. All the investment-grade securities were rated BBB- or higher by at least one of the 
major credit rating agencies. Id. 
 226. This is because part of the value of the asset serving as collateral depended on leveraged 
liquidity. Gabilondo, supra note 9, at 466–67. A reduction in the leverage that had underwritten 
demand for the asset would effectively reduce the value of the asset. 
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Although much of the collateral was public, its quality was uneven. 
Maiden Lane’s audited financial statements for 2008 (its first year) do 
not specify whether any of these were sub-investment grade assets, but at 
the time, at least 3% of the fair value of the securities had ratings no 
higher than BB+, which is the lowest investment-grade rating.227 This 
suggests that some of these assets were of relatively low quality. Their 
credit quality declined substantially over the life of Maiden Lane, such 
that in 2011 over one-half of its fair value was made up of securities rat-
ed no higher than BB+.228 
The Fed adhered to the fair-value standards of the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board when establishing its financial hospitals.229 
These standards create a valuation hierarchy for assets, which are catego-
rized into one of three levels based on whether active trading markets 
exist for the asset or its proxy.230 A Level 1 asset is one for which there is 
an active market that provides directly observable price and quote infor-
                                                     
 227. MAIDEN LANE LLC, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD MARCH 
14, 2008 TO DECEMBER 31, 2008 AND INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT 18 (2008), available at 
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http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/news/markets/2010/ ma100331.html; see also Craig Torres, Bob 
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Firm, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-01/fed-reveals-bear-
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Merkel, Thoughts on Maiden Lane II, ALEPH BLOG (Apr. 4, 2010), http://alephblog.com/ 
2010/04/04/thoughts-on-maiden-lane-iii/. 
 230. See FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 157, FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT: 
DETERMINING THE FAIR VALUE OF A FINANCIAL ASSET WHEN THE MARKET FOR THAT ASSET IS 
NOT ACTIVE (2008), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere= 
1175820925446&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs (inter-
preting fair value for inactive markets); see also Tammy Whitehouse, When Bear Stearns Rammed 
into Fair Value, COMPLIANCE WKLY., Apr. 8, 2008 (noting the difficulty of applying FAS 157 when 
trading liquidity dries up); Richard J. Herring, Fair Value Accounting, Disclosure and Financial 
Stability: Does How We Keep Score Influence How the Game Is Played? (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., 
Working Paper No. 11-72, 2011). 
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mation.231 A Level 2 asset is one without an active market but with a 
proxy market in which price information about a similar asset can be ob-
served directly.232 A Level 3 asset has neither an actual nor a proxy mar-
ket.233 It is priced based on the investor’s own assumptions, often using a 
proprietary valuation model. 
None of the assets purchased by Maiden Lane (the first collateral 
deal) had an active market; hence, all of the purchased assets were ini-
tially classified as Level 2 or 3.234 By the end of 2009, however, the trad-
ing markets for many of these assets had increased such that some assets 
moved higher up on the valuation hierarchy to Level 1. By 2012, Maiden 
Lane had repaid the loan from the Fed in full, although the Fed stands to 
make more money after other subordinated investors have been repaid.235 
2. Maiden Lane II (Securities Lending) 
As 2008 unfolded, the Fed began to see that Bear was not alone in 
terms of collateral problems. The next Maiden Lane responded to AIG, 
an insurance company.236 Insurance companies do not ordinarily suffer 
liquidity problems of this type, but AIG began experiencing a serious 
liquidity crisis due to its securities lending activities (discussed here) and 
its unregulated dealing in credit derivatives (discussed below in the con-
text of Maiden Lane III).237 The firm’s liquidity problems had begun to 
emerge in 2007 and had worsened in the spring of 2008 after a credit 
downgrade.238 
In securities lending, AIG would lend out some of its securities, re-
ceive cash collateral, and then invest that collateral in investment-grade 
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ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-975, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: STATUS OF 
GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO AIG 16 (2009). 
 237. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND THE 
GOVERNMENT’S EXIT STRATEGY 71 (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-
111JPRT56698/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT56698.pdf (“Maiden Lane II (ML2) was set up by FRBNY to 
address the liquidity problems AIG was encountering in early November 2008 in its securities lend-
ing program.”). 
 238. See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 236. One hundred years to the 
month after the Knickerbocker Trust crisis of 1907, the AIG crisis led Congress to pass a plan to 
support the banking sector by giving the Treasury wide discretion over $700 billion, an appropria-
tion equal to almost 8% of the then-outstanding public debt of the United States. 
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assets that were backed by subprime mortgages.239 As these assets 
dropped in value, AIG found that it could not return the cash collateral to 
its securities-lending counterparties. After AIG’s position became critical 
in the fall of 2008, Maiden Lane II paid AIG for the assets that it had 
bought with the cash collateral from its securities lending.240 These assets 
were backed by the riskier tranches of mortgage-backed securities.241 
Maiden Lane II acquired this portfolio at a discount below the par value 
of these securities, paying about fifty cents on the dollar.242 With the 
money from the sale to Maiden Lane II, AIG could settle its obligations 
to its securities-lending counterparties.243 
As with the Bear deal, the Fed priced Maiden Lane II at fair value, 
this time based on a valuation by the investment management company 
BlackRock.244 Although the deal would not close until December, the 
date at which fair value was assessed was October 31, 2008.245 Almost 
certainly, some of these assets were below investment grade because al-
most 20% of the fair value was made up of securities rated no higher 
than BB+.246 And two-thirds of these were backed by subprime assets.247 
More so than with the first Maiden Lane, the credit quality of these assets 
deteriorated quickly and substantially such that one year later less than 
25% of the fair value248 was in securities rated more than BB+, and by 
2011249 the threshold had dropped to 15%. AIG has since resumed its 
securities lending operations.250 
                                                     
 239. Miles Weiss, AIG to Absorb $5 Billion Loss on Securities Lending (Update 3), 
BLOOMBERG, June 27, 2008 (describing how AIG’s insurance units had invested cash collateral in 
subprime assets). The operations were centralized through AIG Securities Lending Corp. 
 240. AIG RMBS LLC Facility: Terms and Conditions, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. (Dec. 16, 
2008), http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/rmbs_terms.html. 
 241. They included ALT ARM and Option ARM products. Maiden Lane II LLC (Non-Agency 
RMBS) Asset Composition by Fair Value, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyork 
fed.org/images/ml/ml2-large1.gif (last visited Nov. 17, 2012). 
 242. Maiden Lane Transactions, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/mar 
kets/maidenlane.html#transactionoverview2 (last visited Nov. 17, 2012) (“As of October 31, 2008, 
the ML II LLC portfolio of assets had an estimated fair value of $20.5 billion and a par value of 
approximately $39.3 billion.”). 
 243. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 237, at 87. 
 244. MAIDEN LANE II LLC, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 31, 2008 TO 
DECEMBER 31, 2008 AND INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT 8, 11 (2008). 
 245. Id. at 11. 
 246. Id. at 15. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 16. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Serena Ng & Erik Holm, AIG Is Resuming Securities Loans, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2011. 
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3. Maiden Lane III (Credit Default Swaps) 
Maiden Lane III also responded to a collateral problem—this time 
the issue was that AIG could not honor collateral calls caused by obliga-
tions under credit-default swaps.251 This time the remedy would be to 
buy assets from counterparties of AIG with respect to which it had writ-
ten credit-default swaps through the insurance company’s financial prod-
ucts unit.252 The assets were collateralized-debt obligations based on 
high-grade and mezzanine-grade asset-backed securities, and on com-
mercial real estate.253 These assets consisted of second-generation asset-
backed securities, in other words structured finance that started not with 
whole loans but with previously structured financial products, hence 
“double-securitized.” On November 25, 2008, Maiden Lane III paid for 
them by forfeiting cash collateral to these counterparties and offering 
additional cash consideration.254 
Initially, all of the assets purchased in 2008 by Maiden Lane III 
were classified as Level 3 for fair-value accounting.255 The 2009 audited 
financial statements for Maiden Lane III revised the fair value classifica-
tion for 2008 to reflect some Level 1 and Level 2 assets as well.256 Com-
pared with the other Maiden Lanes, this one started out with assets of 
lower credit quality, such that almost one-third of its original portfolio 
was rated no more than BB+.257 Within one year it had deteriorated so 
that only 25% of the securities were rated more than BB+.258 By 2011, 
the quality had dropped further, such that only 4% of the securities were 
rated more than BB+.259 
                                                     
 251. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, 
SIGTARP-10-003, FACTORS AFFECTING EFFORTS TO LIMIT PAYMENTS TO AIG COUNTERPARTIES 7 
(2009) [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN.], available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/ 
Audit%20Reports/Factors_Affecting_Efforts_to_Limit_Payments_to_AIG_Counterparties.pdf 
(“[L]iquidity issues resulted largely from its obligation to post collateral in connection with its credit 
default swaps.”). 
 252. Essentially, Maiden Lane stepped into AIG’s short put position on these swaps by per-
forming on the swaps. 
 253. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., AIG CDO LLC Facility: Terms and Condi-
tions (Dec. 3, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/aclf_terms.html. 
 254. Id. 
 255. MAIDEN LANE III LLC, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 31, 2008 TO 
DECEMBER 31, 2008 AND INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT 11 (2008). 
 256. Id. 
 257. MAIDEN LANE III LLC, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 
2009, AND FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 31, 2008 TO DECEMBER 31, 2008, AND INDEPENDENT 
AUDITORS' REPORT 14 (2010). 
 258. Id. at 17. 
 259. Maiden Lane III LLC, Financial Statements for the Years Ended December 31, 2011 and 
2010, and Independent Auditor’s Report 19 (Mar. 20, 2012). 
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C. Outpatient 
The Fed also used section 13(3) to set up five emergency-liquidity 
programs that “backstopped the shadow banking system.”260 With one 
exception, all of these programs targeted nonbanks, including securities 
firms, corporations, money market mutual funds, and other investors.261 
The Fed also established a securities-lending facility (based on other au-
thorities) that complemented these emergency-liquidity efforts by letting 
firms swap bad collateral for good collateral.262 These programs were 
premised on the same financial logic as the Maiden Lane deals: reviving 
the interbank-funding market would mean accepting a variety of collat-
eral from nonbank firms. Only this way could the Fed stabilize three key 
sectors of the interbank market that had begun to experience interbank 
“runs”—repurchase agreements, commercial paper, and money market 
mutual funds.263 Used heavily during the worst part of the financial cri-
sis, several of these programs had temporary loan balances of between 
$100–350 billion.264 
At roughly the same time that the Fed created the first Maiden 
Lane, the repo market for the Treasury’s primary dealers became the ini-
tial focus of these programs.265 These programs operated like a discount 
window for primary dealers, who, like banks, could now borrow against 
a wide range of collateral.266 Conditions in the repo market got worse 
after Lehman’s collapse in September 2008, during which the volume of 
settlement fails increased thirty-fold compared to conditions before the 
                                                     
 260. These were the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, the Asset-Backed Money Market Fund 
Liquidity Facility, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, the Money Market Investors Funding 
Facility, and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility. Forms of Federal Reserve Lending, 
FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/Forms_of_Fed_Lending.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2012); see POZSAR ET AL., supra note 21, at 24 (“The Federal Reserve’s 13(3) emer-
gency lending facilities that followed in the wake of Lehman’s bankruptcy amounted to a backstop 
of all the functional steps involved in the shadow credit intermediation process.”). 
 261. The Asset-Backed Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility was open primarily to deposito-
ry institutions, bank holding companies, and U.S. branches of foreign banks. 
 262. This was the term Securities Lending Facility. Forms of Federal Reserve Lending, supra 
note 260. 
 263. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo (Yale Int’l 
Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 09-14, 2010) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1440752 (arguing that “securitized banking” funded by repurchase agreements came to 
substitute for “traditional banking” funded by deposits). Essentially, this entire market began to face 
a run. Because similar runs happened with asset-backed commercial paper, structured-investment 
vehicles, and money market mutual funds, we should understand these as runs on interbank funding 
generally. Id.; see also The Fed and Libor, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007. 
 264. Johnson, supra note 1, at 29 (listing high balances for the collateral programs). 
 265. These were the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) and the Term Security Lending 
Facility (TSLF). Id. at 21–22. 
 266. See Adrian et al., supra note 165, at 32. 
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crisis.267 In response, the Fed expanded its liquidity support by making 
non-investment-grade securities and equities eligible as collateral for 
lending.268 The Fed also let its members swap private mortgage-backed 
securities, which lenders no longer wanted to hold as collateral for loans, 
for Treasury securities that could still serve as good collateral for repo.269 
This help did not come cheaply because the rate was high enough to en-
courage firms to shift to private financing as soon as the market could 
provide a better rate.270 Dealers borrowed extensively from these facili-
ties, which probably had a role in the improvement of the credit ratings 
of these dealers.271 
Three other liquidity programs related to commercial paper and 
money market mutual funds, market sectors that overlapped somewhat 
with each other. The risk premium for investment-grade commercial pa-
per issued through asset-backed vehicles had been increasing.272 As a 
result, corporations that got short-term financing through commercial 
paper were having difficulty placing their paper, even with mutual-
market funds that often invested in high-quality commercial paper.273 
The volume of commercial paper shrank by one-third.274 This meant that 
issuers of commercial paper had to refinance more often and had to face 
rising interest rates. 
In response, the Fed set up a dealer facility to support the market by 
buying commercial paper.275 The facility bought both secured and unse-
cured paper, but the latter was subject to an additional fee to compensate 
the Fed for the increased risk.276 To add term to the market (by increasing 
the duration of instruments), the facility focused on paper with a maturity 
                                                     
 267. Hördahl & King, supra note 35, at 46 (noting increase in September 2008 to nearly $2.7 
trillion from $90 billion average during previous two years). At around this time, the Fed extended 
the PDCF to offer “transitional credit” to other investment-banking operations. Susan McLaughlin, 
The U.S. Tri-Party Repo Market Reforms, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. 2 (Oct. 7, 2011), 
http://newyorkfed.org/research/conference/2011/mp_workshop/slides/Mclaughlin.pdf. 
 268. See Adrian et al., supra note 165, at 29. 
 269. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 132. 
 270. See Sudeep Reddy, As It Starts Programs, Fed Weighs How to Stop Them, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 23, 2009, at A4. 
 271. See Adrian et al., supra note 165, at 31. 
 272. Cecchetti, supra note 197, at 60 (noting that the usual spread of five basis points between 
asset-backed commercial paper and that of nonfinancial issuers went as high as 150 basis points in 
the last quarter of 2007). Traditionally, these vehicles have not been included in the interbank mar-
ket, but I think they belong because often both the borrower and the lender are financial firms. 
 273. Johnson, supra note 1, at 22. After World War II, the commercial paper market had grown 
as both financial and other companies turned to it rather than to banks for their short-term borrowing 
and lending needs. Rowe, supra note 56, at 111, 118–19. 
 274. Cecchetti, supra note 197, at 60 (noting that the commercial paper shrank by one-third—
from $2.2 trillion to $1.5 trillion). 
 275. Johnson, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing the Commercial Paper Funding Facility). 
 276. Adrian et al., supra note 165, at 33. 
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of three months and undertook to hold its investments to maturity, that 
way protecting the market from more refinancing risk.277 Correctly, the 
Fed saw what it was doing as expanding its traditional market-making 
efforts to reach new sectors of the funding market.278 As intended, these 
efforts temporarily stabilized the marketing of commercial paper by in-
creasing the volume of borrowing and lowering borrowing rates.279 
It was not enough, though, to mitigate the effects of Lehman’s col-
lapse in September 2008. That was when a large money market mutual 
fund “broke the buck.”280 Money market mutual funds promise to satisfy 
their investors’ requests for redemption each day at the price of a dollar 
per share. But on September 16, 2008, a large fund suspended redemp-
tions for seven days.281 At this point, the Fed took “the wholesale money 
market onto its own balance sheet, stepping in as dealer of last resort for 
the money market.”282 It did this with two other programs similar to the 
commercial paper facility, which also directed liquidity to mutual funds 
as their investors tried to cash out.283 
The final program developed by the Fed sought to support the secu-
ritization of other kinds of asset-backed securities.284 This program 
sought to provide credit for investors to buy investment-grade tranches of 
                                                     
 277. Id. at 30. 
 278. Id. at 29–30. “The Federal Reserve’s financial transactions were limited to open market 
operations with primary dealers and loans to depository institutions through the discount window. 
The CPFF operation married aspects of both types of Fed operations with the market conventions of 
the commercial paper market.” Id. at 31. (internal citation omitted). 
 279. Id. at 35–36. 
 280. Shefali Anand & Diya Gullapalli, Breaking Buck Was Ironic for Trumpeter of Safe Fund, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122169 845959750475.html; Sam 
Mamudi & Jonathan Burton, Money Market Breaks the Buck, Freezes Redemptions, 
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 17, 2008), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2008-09-17/finance/307382 
59_1_peter-crane-reserve-primary-fund-money-market. 
 281. Mamudi & Burton, supra note 280 (describing liquidity problems of the Reserve Primary 
Fund). 
 282. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 125. 
 283. In September 2008, the Fed started the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market 
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility to help finance the redemption requests made on money market 
mutual funds. Johnson, supra note 1, at 22. The program ran from September 22, 2008 through 
February 1, 2010. For a description of how the fund worked, see Asset Backed Commercial Paper 
Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, FED. RES. DISCOUNT WINDOW, 
http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/mmmf.cfm?hdrID=14 (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). The follow-
ing month, the Fed established another facility to support money market funds—the Money Market 
Investor Funding Facility—but no credit was ever extended under it. Press Release, Fed. Reserve, 
Federal Reserve Announces the Creation of the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF), 
(Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/20081021a.htm; see 
also Johnson, supra note 1, at 23. 
 284. What the Fed set up was the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, established in 
November 2008. Johnson, supra note 1, at 24; see Jonathan G. Katz, Who Benefits from Bailouts, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 1568, 1582–83 (2011) (reviewing TALF as part of estimating the costs of the Trou-
bled Assets Relief Program). 
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asset-backed securities based on consumer loans, student loans, small 
business loans, and commercial real estate loans.285 It was another way to 
reach the shadow-banking sector that had become a key part of the credit 
market.286 In the end, it had relatively little impact because it supported 
few deals.287 
IV. IN DEFENSE OF THE FED 
The Fed’s emergency-liquidity efforts had worked in practice.288 
Could they be made to work in theory? This Part says “yes” despite the 
case against the Fed. This type of criticism is nothing new because the 
Fed has a contradictory mandate over economic goals whose meaning is 
permanently contestable. Inflation hawks want the Fed to raise rates 
when inflation is a risk even when this may come at the expense of em-
ployment.289 Unemployment doves have the opposite preferences, favor-
ing lower rates that might create jobs by stimulating the economy.290 So 
Manichean choices and popular suspicion are typical for the Fed. What 
was unusual about the recent criticism was not just its vitriol but also the 
seeming depth of its consensus: the “blasting of Bernanke from both ex-
tremes [hawks and doves] is, to put it mildly, unprecedented.”291 
This Part addresses three major kinds of objections to the Fed’s 
emergency-liquidity programs. First, many concluded that these deals 
were bad policy because the Fed had become a Leviathan—
overextending itself and displacing free market mechanisms. Second, a 
handful of critics suggested that these actions exceeded the Fed’s legal 
authority. Third, many accused the Fed of a public accountability deficit 
because it had carried out these efforts without adequate transparency. 
                                                     
 285. See Brian Sack, Remarks at the New York Association for Business Economics, New 
York City: Reflections on the TALF and the Federal Reserve’s Role as Liquidity Provider (June 9, 
2010) (transcript available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2010/sac100 
609.html). 
 286. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 254–55. 
 287. TALF ended up supporting twenty-six deals involving asset-backed securities and com-
mercial mortgage-backed securities. Sack, supra note 285. 
 288. The consensus about these collateral deals and programs was that “[h]owever untidily the 
rescue was managed, the financial crisis is over.” Lowenstein, supra note 17, at 49. 
 289. The distributional impact of inflation is itself contestable. It makes the worst off worse off 
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they have less disposable income. Looming fiscal cuts make this risk even greater because cutting 
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 290. George Melloan, Bernanke’s Exit Dilemma, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2009, at A13 (arguing 
that the Fed lacks tools to mitigate inflation). 
 291. Lowenstein, supra note 17, at 52. 
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As discussed below, I disagree with the first and second claims. I demur 
in part to the third claim, suggesting that the accountability deficit must 
be put in the context both of the Fed’s counter-majoritarian mandate and 
its role in promoting our somewhat tacit industrial policy towards the 
financial sector. 
A. Market Structure Policy 
Some of the most compelling objections to the Fed’s emergency-
liquidity efforts rest on rival views over where to draw the line between 
the market and the state, an issue at the heart of market-structure poli-
cy.292 The most radical objection of this sort is the idea that the Fed ought 
not to exist, stated forcefully by Ron Paul in End the Fed.293 In this view, 
giving the Fed a monopoly on money creation violates free enterprise294 
and amounts to a global “counterfeiting operation to sustain monopolistic 
financial cartels”295 and “socialism.”296 Instead, we should promote, or at 
least tolerate, open-market competition, returning to what Paul calls 
“private (free) banking,” in which anyone can compete to produce a 
mechanism to serve as money.297 This argument overlooks the fact that it 
was just this kind of wildcat banking that persuaded Congress to create 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in 1863. Moreover, it 
would seem that radical objections to the existence of a central bank in 
the United States were put to rest in 1913 by passage of the Act.298 
                                                     
 292. The idea of “market structure” refers to the totality of institutional features and arrange-
ments that influence the production and exchange of a good or service. I include the primary market 
in this notion although economists often think of it in terms of exchanges happening only in the 
secondary market. Peter Dattels, The Microstructure of Government Securities Markets (Int’l Mone-
tary Fund, Working Paper No. 117, 1995). Dattels defines “market structure” as “the organization of 
the secondary market including market access, order handling, the trading mechanism, transparency, 
the role of intermediaries, clearing and settlement services, and so forth.” COORDINATING PUBLIC 
DEBT AND MONETARY MANAGEMENT 418 (Peter Dattels et al. eds., 1997). 
 293. Paul’s position is clear: “The Federal Reserve should be abolished because it is immoral, 
unconstitutional, impractical, promotes bad economics, and undermines liberty. Its destructive nature 
makes it a tool of tyrannical government.” RON PAUL, END THE FED 141 (2009). During the 2012 
election cycle, the Fed was a target of other Republican candidates, including Sarah Palin, Michele 
Bachman, Herman Cain, and Rick Perry, but it was Paul who had developed the most substantive 
critique of the Fed. Paul relies on the economic theory of Austrian economists Ludvig von Mises and 
Friedrich Hayek. Id. at 6, 29 (mentioning Mises’s The Theory of Money and Credit and Hayek’s 
Choice in Currency). 
 294. Id. at 205. 
 295. Id. at 109. 
 296. He states, “Think of [the] Soviet system applied to the banking industry and you have the 
Fed.” Id. at 28. 
 297. Id. at 205. 
 298. In general, Woodrow Wilson’s successes in implementing progressive reforms between 
1913 and 1921 represented a temporary victory over the strongest forms of libertarian fundamental-
ism. Another example from the period would be the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 
and the first major federal income tax. 
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More moderate objections to the Fed’s emergency-liquidity pro-
grams are those that recognize one of the central points of Parts I and 
II—that credit markets are often made and remade based on public exi-
gencies.299 Examples include objections raised by the Fed’s traditional 
defenders, many of whom wondered whether the Fed’s emergency-
liquidity efforts had gone too far. Former Fed chairman Paul Volcker 
suggested that the Fed’s emergency initiatives had gone to the very limit 
of the institution’s authorities.300 Former Fed staffer Vince Reinhart 
called the Bear deal a “policy mistake.”301 Economist John Taylor criti-
cized the Fed’s failure to articulate clear criteria about who would quali-
fy for its liquidity assistance.302 
What would have happened had the Fed stuck to its traditional 
lender of last resort, helping only banks that could provide traditional 
collateral for emergency liquidity? A starting point for the thought exper-
iment is what actually did happen when the Fed did not bail out Lehman 
Brothers, which went on to file the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.303 
Lehman’s bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008, was the low point 
for the interbank market.304 Scenario analysis based on what did not hap-
pen suffers from Knightian uncertainty, the kind of uncertainty that can-
not be measured and, thus, mitigated through foresight.305 Indeed, what 
happened with Lehman frustrated the efforts of authorities to anticipate 
risk because the resulting losses and disruptions proved to be much 
worse for more parties than expected.306 Probably, the destabilizing li-
quidity dynamics that emerged beginning with Bear and AIG would have 
been worse, visiting deeper losses against a wider range of counterpar-
ties.307 This disruption would likely have further harmed the money mar-
                                                     
 299. The academic literature on the microstructure of securities markets has addressed market 
making in some detail. AMIHUD, HO & SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, at 1, 9–10. 
 300. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 173. 
 301. Id. at 174. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Five weeks later, Lehman’s former CEO had registered his newly-formed investment 
group. Susanne Craig & Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, From Lehman’s Wreckage, New Lives, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 12, 2009, at 1. 
 304. Hördahl & King, supra note 35, at 37, 44 (describing the “virtual shutdown of the unse-
cured interbank lending market”). 
 305. Knightian uncertainty refers to risks whose probabilities cannot be known or estimated. 
Matthew Pritsker, Knightian Uncertainty and Interbank Lending, J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION (forth-
coming 2012). It presents a particular challenge to ex ante attempts to limit risk. 
 306. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 188–89. 
 307. Several different kinds of assets would have lost value quickly, visiting losses on the firms 
that held these assets. Unrealized losses would begin to accrue, and eventually these firms would 
have to write down their value on their balance sheets, making public this material trend about their 
financial position. As balance sheet losses consumed the firm’s equity-capital surplus accounts, at 
best the firm would become more leveraged, potentially triggering creditors’ remedies that might 
intensify the spiral, for example by requiring that the firm post cash to collateralize its exposure, 
2013] Financial Hospitals: Defending the Fed 775 
ket, crucial to the short-term financing needs of companies and a theater 
for the Fed’s monetary policy initiatives.308 
My point is not to say that the Fed’s emergency-liquidity programs 
were optimal—they were adequate under the circumstances, but they 
came with downsides too. The Bear deal did create a moral hazard by 
sending a signal that the federal government might come to the assis-
tance of nonbank firms that had made losing bets in the credit market. 
Federal authorities had their reasons for helping Bear and not Lehman, 
but the rule of decision was not very clear at the time.309 Regrettably, 
bank lending has not increased as hoped. Instead, banks have stockpiled 
cash at the Fed in their reserve deposits, which may provide latent fi-
nancing for inflationary demand that could lead to another bubble.310 The 
Fed should, as the old saying goes, remove the punch bowl just as the 
party is getting started.311 This time, though, some got punch drunk while 
others were shut out of credit.312 
Specifically, as a Congressional oversight panel concluded, AIG’s 
shareholders and creditors received a windfall because Maiden Lane III 
paid full value for financial instruments that at the time were being deep-
ly discounted by the market.313 Initially, the Fed had sought concessions 
from AIG’s counterparties in credit-default swaps that would have re-
flected ordinary market losses.314 Although Maiden Lane II had been 
able to buy assets from AIG at such a market discount, the Fed was una-
                                                                                                   
which would tax the already strained liquidity of the firm. Many firms would become bankrupt, 
causing ripple effects to counterparties and financial markets more widely. Eventually, entire mar-
kets for certain products would dry up, making it hard for other firms to even value their holdings of 
affected securities. 
 308. It was the rush of investors to redeem shares of the Reserve Primary Fund after the Leh-
man bankruptcy that triggered the crisis in the money market that led to the Fed’s interventions 
there. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 206. 
 309. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 251, at 28 (“Because Federal Re-
serve and Treasury officials believed that an AIG bankruptcy could ultimately have a greater system-
ic impact than Lehman’s bankruptcy one day before, they decided that additional federal support 
was needed to maintain the overall stability of the financial markets.”). 
 310. Ian Bremmer & Nouriel Roubini, How the Fed Can Avoid the Next Bubble, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 6, 2009, at A23 (warning that keeping interest rates low to stabilize the economy may risk an-
other asset bubble). 
 311. The statement is attributed to William McChesney Martin, a highly influential Fed 
Chairman. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 474. The occasion for the statement was probably the Fed’s 
role in managing the “overheating” of the economy due to low interest rates. The recent crisis dealt 
with financial speculation, which is distinct from generic overheating, so this is an analogy to em-
phasize the Fed’s role in countercyclical self-restraint. 
 312. S. Mitra Kalita, The Democratization of Credit Is Over – Now It’s Payback Time, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 10, 2009, at A1 (analyzing increase in debt among lower-income households). 
 313. In effect, AIG’s creditors received “the entire notional amount of the CDOs [their invest-
ment] at a time when the market value of those CDOs was less than half of that amount.” CONG. 
OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 237, at 74. 
 314. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 251, at 15. 
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ble to secure any such concessions when setting up Maiden Lane III from 
seven of the eight major creditors of AIG.315 So the asset purchases by 
Maiden Lane III were done at par. This perverse redistribution departed 
from the ordinary loss-sharing of a bankruptcy proceeding.316 Presuma-
bly, the decision to pay full price for these assets reflected a policy de-
termination by the Fed that doing the deal at par value was consistent 
with the stabilization goals of the deal.317 Not surprisingly, the Inspector 
General’s report for the Troubled Assets Relief Program later found fault 
with the Fed’s refusal to insist that these counterparties bear some loss.318 
In effect, the report suggested that pricing of these purchases created a 
moral hazard and treated similarly situated investors differently by im-
munizing some from market losses. 
These concerns about moral hazard and horizontal equity are legit-
imate, but only as part of a conceptual framework that recognizes that the 
Fed had to mutate along with the market. This meant updating Bagehot’s 
axiom about last-resort liquidity to recognize a broader role for the cen-
tral bank when credit had become a commodity traded by banks, non-
bank lenders, and other firms.319 Central banking experts had already 
outlined how such a role might work.320 Departing from the traditional 
lender of last resort, the Fed would have to become a giant market maker 
for credit-trading mechanisms.321 Like the lender of last resort, though, 
this would be a public function because the need for it arises only when 
private market makers have stopped supporting the price mechanism.322 
Although particular firms might be saved, this could only be an inci-
dental by-product of shoring up trading mechanisms as a whole.323 
                                                     
 315. Id. at 15–20. 
 316. Ordinarily, “the costs of AIG’s inability to meet its derivative obligations would have 
been borne entirely by AIG’s shareholders and creditors under the well-established rules of 
bankrupty.” CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 237, at 3. 
 317. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 251, at 9–11 (analyzing the Treasury 
and the Fed’s rationale for supporting AIG). 
 318. Id. at 28–30. 
 319. BAGEHOT, supra note 2. 
 320. Buiter & Sibert, supra note 5 (“Even if the assets are impaired, there should still be a 
market to sell them at a discount appropriate to the central bank’s assessment of its risk of default 
and the central bank’s assessment of the orderly market price of risk.”). What the Fed did is related 
to Steven Schwarcz’s notion of having a provider of last resort for market liquidity in financial mar-
kets. Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 248–57. 
 321. Buiter & Sibert, supra note 5 (“If the markets for selling impaired assets or for borrowing 
using impaired assets as collateral seize up and cease to function, the central bank must step in to 
perform its market maker of last resort functions.”). 
 322. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 130 (“Like lender of last resort, dealer of last resort is inher-
ently a public function, not a private function.”); see also Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 254 (analyzing 
disincentives to private investors acting as market liquidity provider). 
 323. William H. Buiter, Central Banks as Market Makers of Last Resort 4; Liquidity, Markets, 
and Mechanisms, FIN. TIMES BLOG (Aug. 23, 2007), http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2007/08/central-
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And this is exactly what the Fed did. It did not call itself a “market 
maker of last resort,” although it suggested as much in Fed-speak by say-
ing that it had become a “substitute for the arbitrage and trading no long-
er being undertaken in sufficient size by the private sector.”324 After all, 
seeking profits through arbitrage and exchange (trading) are at the core 
of what markets do. Haltingly, and, in fact, only as a last resort, the Fed 
emerged from the discount window so that it could reach into the shad-
ow-banking sector.325 Its theater of operations became the interbank li-
quidity cycle.326 By re-enacting a miniature secondary market for struc-
tured finance through the Maiden Lanes and its secured lending pro-
grams for nonbanks, the Fed provided liquidity, term, and price discov-
ery, stemming the bear cycle.327 The Fed financed this by borrowing re-
serves from commercial banks and recirculating them into the economy 
through efforts on behalf of a progressively wider set of liquidity cli-
ents—banks, then primary dealers, then commercial paper issuers and 
money market mutual funds, and, finally, other securitization vehicles.328 
Through the Maiden Lane companies, the Fed bought distressed as-
sets and—forbearing the freedom enjoyed by a private investor—
committed to hold them until the price was right, even up to maturity.329 
This added term and liquidity. Synthetically bullish, the Maiden Lanes 
                                                                                                   
banks-ahtml-3/#axzz2KUuoKeIk (“Central banks in times of crisis should aim to support/bail out 
markets and other valuable social mechanisms; they should not support or bail out companies, part-
nerships or individuals, unless this is an unavoidable feature of supporting market and mecha-
nisms.”). Indeed, insolvent firms should be allowed to fail because “Darwin must have his pound of 
flesh also in the financial markets.” Buiter & Sibert, supra note 5. 
 324. That is the gist of Fed Governor Donald Kohn’s comments in the middle of the 2008 
crisis: “To ameliorate the threat to financial and economic stability, the Federal Reserve and a num-
ber of other central banks in effect found they needed to provide a substitute for the arbitrage and 
trading no longer being undertaken in sufficient size by the private sector.” Kohn, supra note 35. 
 325. Adrian et al., supra note 165, at 34 (“Effectively, these facilities extended the Federal 
Reserve’s lender-of-last-resort role to include nondepository institutions (the PDCF, TSLF, and 
AMLF) and specific securities markets (the CPFF and TALF).”); see also MEHRLING, supra note 5, 
at 124 (“And the big thing about the Fed’s response was that it stepped in as the dealer of last resort 
to replace the private dealer system.”). 
 326. Especially in an interbank environment where a firm relied heavily on the ability to get 
overnight and short-term financing, the disappearance of asset liquidity soon impacts the firm’s own 
institutional liquidity because it can no longer convert its financial assets into overnight cash. Unmit-
igated, firm illiquidity can soon become insolvency, illustrating what happened in 2008 in the inter-
bank market—asset liquidity became fund illiquidity, which threatened insolvency and cascading 
effects on other firms. 
 327. In a sense, what the Fed was intermediating was the dynamic of intermediation itself. It 
did this on one level by breathing value back into assets that had previously served as collateral but 
had gone bad in the liquidity panic. More radically, by broadening the kinds of assets deemed ac-
ceptable as collateral, the Fed was imbuing new asset classes with the status of collateral, essentially 
creating new collateral markets. 
 328. Forms of Federal Reserve Lending, supra note 260. 
 329. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 213. 
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boosted asset values and the net worth of owning firms, whose liquidity 
problems were kept at bay.330 In time, the market responded with sus-
tained interest in the assets, which were then resold by the Maiden Lane 
vehicles.331 
The Maiden Lanes also enhanced price discovery for structured fi-
nance products. According to clarifications about fair-value accounting 
rules for inactive markets, when the reference market for a financial asset 
becomes increasingly inactive, the asset may have to be reclassified from 
Level 2 to Level 3.332 Like a private dealer, the Fed’s financial hospitals 
created an active market and provided quotes and transaction prices, po-
tentially impacting how assets belonging to other investors would be val-
ued. Some accounting research is needed to determine the extent to 
which, once the Fed had “discovered” the exchange value of the assets 
purchased by the Maiden Lanes, other investors holding the same type of 
assets (or proxy assets) could free ride on the Fed’s valuation marks to 
shore up their own balance sheet.333 This consequence of fair value ac-
counting would have magnified the Fed’s bullish strategies. Presumably, 
insofar as the Maiden Lanes increased the assets that could be classified 
as Level 1 or Level 2, they also limited the impact of investors’ proprie-
tary models on price discovery because it is these models that influence 
valuation when there is no active market.334 
Admittedly, what the Fed paid is not identical to an open market 
price because the Fed did these trades for another, governmental purpose. 
In this sense, the Fed’s purchases were “forced,” a factor which account-
ing advice from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission con-
cludes might suggest that the Fed paid more than fair value because no 
                                                     
 330. Unfortunately, how these assets were kept at bay was misunderstood: 
It sounded as if Bernanke was suggesting that Treasury buy the assets from banks at an 
inflated price to pump up their profits and thus their capital. What he meant, he explained 
later, was that the presence of the Treasury as a buyer would push up the price of the as-
sets closer to their long-run value. But even sophisticated observers misunderstood him. 
Id. 
 331. Michael J. de la Merced, Maiden Loans Repaid, But Assets Still Must Be Sold, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (June 14, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/maiden-lane-loans-repaid-but-
assets-still-need-to-be-sold/ (“The Maiden Lane assets have been in hot demand.”). 
 332. FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., supra note 230, at 4–5 para. A32A (discussing how the fair 
value is calculated for a collateralized debt obligation without an active market). 
 333. For example, the Fed’s sales from its structured finance deals revived the ordinary ebb 
and flow of price discovery in which rising delinquency rates on underlying subprime mortgages 
lowered the sales price of the asset-backed securities and declining delinquency rates boosted the 
sales prices. See Maiden Lane Helps Cut Rally Short for U.S. Subprime CDS, FITCH RATINGS, July 
13, 2011 (noting rising delinquency rates and unsuccessful auction results); Maiden Lane in Rear 
View for U.S. Subprime CDS Prices For Now, FITCH RATINGS, Aug. 15, 2011 (noting decline in 
delinquency rates and rising prices for Maiden Lane’s subprime collateralized debt securities). 
 334. More accounting research is needed to see how firms used the Fed’s deal information in 
their own fair value calculations. 
2013] Financial Hospitals: Defending the Fed 779 
one wanted it at that price.335 But it is an approximation that probably 
made a fair amount of sense given that subsequent re-sales of these assets 
have validated the Fed’s value estimates.336 
The Fed’s secured-lending programs followed a financial logic sim-
ilar to the Maiden Lanes. Hyman Minsky’s work on financial instability 
provides a useful frame for understanding why this worked.337 Broaden-
ing the kinds of assets that nonbank firms could pledge as collateral in 
repo transactions made both the assets and the firms more liquid. Hold-
ing investments to maturity (as the commercial paper facility had done) 
added term, further stabilizing the market. What the Fed accomplished 
through these market-making initiatives was to create synthetic hedge 
assets from speculative and Ponzi ones, that way recapitalizing firms by 
resuscitating the asset side of their balance sheet.338 These benefits mili-
tate in favor of permitting the Fed to act as a market maker of last resort. 
Accepting that the Fed ought to act as a market maker of last resort 
raises questions about when it should do so. This kind of extraordinary 
intervention is justified not simply when individual products are losing 
value but instead when it seems that the trading system as a whole is 
breaking down.339 Financial crises involving this dynamic suggest that 
market architecture itself—the way that pricing and liquidity are institu-
tionalized—is crumbling.340 
Bagehot’s guidance to lend only against good collateral could be 
applied in a relatively straightforward manner when the collateral was 
                                                     
 335. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Office of the Chief Accountant and FASB 
Staff Clarifications on Fair Value Accounting (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2008/2008-234.htm (providing guidance on valuation of financial assets in inactive mar-
kets). 
 336. Jerry W. Markham, Regulating Credit Default Swaps in the Wake of the Subprime Crisis 
19 (Dec. 2, 2009) (working paper) (suggesting that the Fed got the benefit of the bargain on its pur-
chases) (on file with author). 
 337. Gabilondo, supra note 9. Mehrling also notes that Minsky’s theory was the one that most 
closely reflected the traditional practices of central banking. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 66. This is 
ironic because Minksy was viewed as being quite left of center. Minsky identified three kinds of 
financing arrangements based on their market and funding liquidity dynamics: hedged, speculative, 
and Ponzi. Only hedge financing ensured a borrower’s ongoing liquidity because only a hedge asset 
would generate the right amount of cash flow at the time needed by the borrower to pay the liability 
that financed the hedge asset. 
 338. Usually recapitalization refers to transactions that affect the items on the right-hand side 
of a firm’s balance sheet. For example, the Treasury’s purchases of preferred stock pursuant to the 
misnamed Troubled Assets Relief Program was a formal recapitalization because the preferred stock 
was booked on the right-hand side of the firms. This time, the Fed was influencing the asset-side of 
these entities—in other words, the left-hand side of the balance sheet. 
 339. Warsh, supra note 26 (“[F]unding market disruptions reflect a striking decline in confi-
dence in the financial architecture itself.”). 
 340. The upside of the cycle obscured the regulatory defects, but the crash made them visible. 
Id. (noting that on the upside “[t]he financial architecture grew increasingly impervious to skeptics 
and dissenters, perpetuating insufficient transparency and under-informed risk-taking”). 
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uniform, namely, all commercial bills. Developing standards for the 
market maker of last resort, however, is more complex because this func-
tion exposes the central banks to potentially larger financial exposure 
from providing liquidity to a wider set of actors on diverse collateral.341 
The Fed ought also to have at least a nominal presence in a wide variety 
of asset markets in which it may, at some point, have to intervene to ac-
quire trading expertise.342 This would avoid the situation where Fed offi-
cials did not learn about key financial products until they had started to 
have systemic impact, as happened with structured-investment vehi-
cles.343 To that end, the Fed should hire specialists with more capital-
markets skills so that it is not surprised by tomorrow’s version of struc-
tured finance.344 The process of articulating public market-making norms 
will probably be iterative, proceeding by trial and error.345 As the Fed has 
noted, it learns by trading.346 
                                                     
 341. Thorvald Grung Moe, Shadow Banking and the Limits of Central Bank Liquidity Support: 
How to Achieve a Better Balance Between Global and Official Liquidity 5–6 (Levy Econ. Inst., 
Working Paper No. 172, 2012) (calling for a “new Bagehot rule” for market maker of last resort 
role). 
 342. Willem H. Buiter, Central Banks as Market Makers of Last Resort 2, FIN. TIMES BLOG 
(Aug. 17, 2007, 3:38AM), http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2007/08/central-banks-ahtml/. 
 343. A structured investment vehicle (SIV) was an entity set up by some banks to economize 
on regulatory capital by shifting some assets off their balance sheet into the SIV, a separately fi-
nanced entity. The problem was that when the assets underperformed, banks often ended up indem-
nifying the SIV investors, a form of moral recourse. Unfortunately, “several top Fed staffers con-
fessed later that they hadn’t even heard the term ‘SIV’ until the end of July” 2007, after banks began 
to bear the funding risk associated with them. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 104–05. 
 344. Buiter, supra note 342 (recommending the hiring of experts in behavioral finance, micro-
market structure, and asset pricing). The Fed has already taken some steps to learn about credit un-
derwritten by lenders other than depository institutions. Beginning in June 2010 the Fed began con-
ducting a Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey on Dealer Financing Terms. 
 345. One example was the serendipitous way that the Fed discovered the policy value of open 
market operations. See supra notes 95–102. The Fed also experimented with foreign currency swaps 
more to learn how they worked than to produce specific outcomes in foreign exchange markets. 2 
MELTZER, supra note 70, at 357 (“The early swap agreements established the practice but were used 
only to gain experience.”); 1 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 19. In the Fed’s case, it is a version of the 
heuristic suggested by Mark Twain’s observation: 
[T]he person that had took a bull by the tail once had learnt sixty or seventy times as 
much as a person that hadn’t, and said a person that started in to carry a cat home by the 
tail was getting knowledge that was always going to be useful to him, and warn’t ever go-
ing to grow dim or doubtful. 
MARK TWAIN, TOM SAWYER ABROAD (1894), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF MARK TWAIN 97 
(1901). 
 346. The Fed has noted: 
Contact with firms operating in the market helps us achieve a better understanding of fi-
nancial market developments and practices, which in turn is useful to us a central bank in 
the formulation and execution of monetary policy, and helps us as well to serve the 
Treasury better in meeting its debt management responsibilities. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-87-55FS, U.S. GOVERNMENT SECURITIES: THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE RESPONSE REGARDING ITS MARKET-MAKING STANDARD 20 (1987). Private firms glean-
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For some it will be enough to show—as this section has tried—that 
the Fed’s emergency-liquidity efforts were justified because they made 
policy sense as efforts to curb financial instability. However, this Article 
now turns to legal and political-economy objections to these efforts be-
cause objections have independently created clouds on the Fed’s legiti-
macy. 
B. Legality 
Law review articles, legal opinions issued by practicing lawyers, 
and statements made in policy discussions have advanced three major 
arguments that the Fed’s collateral initiatives were illegal,347 and I re-
spond to them in turn. First, some have made a substance-over-form ar-
gument that although the Fed styled its actions as providing loans, these 
actions are more properly characterized as buying assets, which exceeds 
the scope of the Fed’s lending authority under section 13(3).348 The se-
cond legal objection is that the Fed took impermissible collateral for 
loans made under section 13(3).349 This argument rests on a narrow read-
ing of the 1991 expansion of the collateral that could be used for section 
13(3) loans. The final major legal objection is that the Fed’s emergency 
                                                                                                   
ing information from trades do the same thing, as was observed about how Goldman Sachs estimated 
its credit risk to AIG: 
Despite the limited market transparency in the summer of 2007, Goldman used what in-
formation there was . . . . Goldman looked to its own experience: in most cases, when the 
bank bought credit protection on an investment, it turned around and sold credit protec-
tion on the same investment to other counterparties. These deals yielded more price in-
formation. 
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 267 (2011). 
 347. Alexander Mehra, Legal Authority in Unusual and Exigent Circumstances: The Federal 
Reserve and the Financial Crisis, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 221, 235 (2010) (“In form, these transactions 
were structured as loans. But in substance, they permitted the Fed to move assets off the balance 
sheets of institutions and onto its own.”). He makes the same constructive asset-purchase argument 
to find that the Fed exceeded its section 13(3) authority when setting up the Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility, the Money Market Investor Funding Facility, Maiden Lane II, and Maiden Lane 
III, the last two of which were used to support AIG. Id. at 243–46. His careful analysis makes two 
other arguments that seem less plausible to me. First, he argues that the investment in Maiden Lane 
did not meet the requirement that the borrower be unable to obtain financing elsewhere. Id. at 239–
40. Second, he argues that the loan did not involve a true discount because the resources offered by 
the Fed were used to acquire the assets posted as collateral to the Fed loan. Id. at 241. He recognizes 
that there are plausible responses to these arguments. Id.; see also Emerson, supra note 17, at 125 
(concluding that loans were asset purchases). 
 348. Mehra, supra note 347, at 235. 
 349. This is the argument in a legal opinion issued by a plaintiff’s firm pursuing litigation 
related to the financial crisis. The opinion concluded that the Maiden Lane deals done by the Fed 
violated statutory restrictions on the Fed’s ability to lend against collateral. Legal Opinion Re: Maid-
en Lane II and Maiden Lane III Loans, AGUIRRE, MORRIS & SEVERSON L.L.P. (Feb. 9, 2010), 
http://www.amslawyers.com/Legal_Opinion_Maiden_Lane_II_and_III.pdf. 
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liquidity initiatives as a whole may have exceeded its legal authority in 
spirit.350 The concern here is that the Maiden Lane deals seemed to target 
specific firms rather than a sector as a whole—impermissible because 
section 13(3) authority was not necessarily intended to authorize liquid-
ity support just on behalf of one particular firm.351 
Before addressing the first argument, it is worth dismissing the 
seeming contradiction in saying that the Fed acted as a market maker of 
last resort (implying outright purchases) by lending. Accepting an asset 
as collateral for a loan does make a market for the asset because its po-
tential future value as collateral makes it more attractive to a prospective 
purchaser. Indeed, this is one of the new realities of the securitized-credit 
market. Hence, it is reasonable to make the substance-versus-form argu-
ment that the Maiden Lane deals were de facto purchases.352 
This argument, however, does not give due regard to the overall 
economic substance of the capital structure of these deals. In each of 
these transactions, the Fed’s main interest was a senior, liquidated credit 
position with priority over subordinated claims that bore the risk of loss 
first. This is substantively congruent with the form of a loan. In the first 
Maiden Lane, for example, J.P. Morgan contributed a $1 billion first-loss 
position that was junior to the Fed’s credit interest of $29 billion.353 
While the Fed’s loan has been repaid, J.P. Morgan is still awaiting pay-
ment.354 In Maiden Lane II, AIG assumed a $1 billion first-loss position 
by agreeing that payment to it by Maiden Lane II would be deferred until 
after the Fed’s credit interest was paid off.355 For Maiden Lane III, AIG 
                                                     
 350. See supra note 17. 
 351. See Levitin, supra note 4, at 498 (“Section 13(3) was always intended as a response to 
market failures, rather than firm failures.”). 
 352. Mehra, supra note 347. 
 353. Maiden Lane paid about $30 billion, based on Bear’s fair-value calculation of the assets. 
The deal closed on June 26, 2008, but the valuation date was March 14, 2008, the same day that a 
credit rating agency downgraded Bear. See Sue Chang, Moody’s Downgrades Bear Stearns to 
‘Baa1,’ MARKETWATCH (Mar. 14, 2008), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2008-03-14/news/ 
30884278_1_long-term-ratings-downgrades-liquidity-position. Presumably, the model that Bear 
used to price its portfolio is proprietary, as I have not been able to track it down. I assume that March 
14 was chosen as the value date so that asset pricing by the model would not reflect any negative 
reaction by markets to Moody’s downgrade of Bear. 
 354. This was the case as of August 2012. 
 355. Maiden Lane II paid about $20 billion for a portfolio that had been discounted from its 
aggregate par value of approximately $39.3 billion. In exchange for its funds, the Fed received a 
credit interest (divided between a principal and interest tranches) of about $19 billion. AIG CDO 
LLC Facility: Terms and Conditions, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. (Dec. 3, 2008) [hereinafter AIG 
CDO], available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/aclf_terms.html. AIG had agreed to defer 
the receipt of $1 billion of the purchase price paid to it by Maiden Lane II. Id. Doing this made the 
Fed’s interest senior and established that AIG would bear the first $1 billion of loss. Id. 
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contributed $5 billion to fund a debt interest junior to that of the Fed.356 
Therefore, in each of these deals the Fed’s position was a credit interest 
senior, both in form and in substance, to the residual interests in the 
company. 
It is also true that the Fed had an upside residual interest in each 
deal, ensuring that most or all of the funds remaining after settling its 
liquidated obligations would inure to the Fed. This property incident, 
however, should be viewed as a separate asset claim distinct from the 
Fed’s credit interests in the Maiden Lanes.357 The Fed kept the entire res-
idue in Maiden Lane remaining after settling its liquidated interests.358 
This interest was junior to J.P. Morgan’s first-loss position.359 This resid-
ual has turned out to have real value because after paying off its credit 
financing (as of March 2012), Maiden Lane still had about $3.5 billion in 
noncash assets, mostly consisting of RMBS and some commercial 
loans.360 The Fed also keeps five-sixths of the residue of Maiden Lane II, 
leaving one-sixth to AIG.361 For Maiden Lane III, the Fed keeps two-
thirds of the residue and AIG gets one-third.362 These residual interests 
were in the nature of equity, but only its upside because they had no 
downside risk. 
The other two legal arguments—about collateral and compliance 
with the Act’s overall purpose—share a narrow understanding of the 
Fed’s authorities; hence, the rejoinder is largely the same. Granted, the 
exact scope of section 13(3) cannot be definitively established ex ante 
because it is designed to respond to unforeseen market conditions.363 The 
Fed’s generative authority to build and regulate credit markets should be 
interpreted broadly, as both Congress and the Fed have done. 
Let me recapitulate. In 1913, its founding statute gave the Fed in-
choate authority to police credit and money conditions, especially 
through rediscounting.364 These authorities were generative in that their 
precise scope could only be known when drawn upon in response to a 
                                                     
 356. Maiden Lane III paid about $20 billion for a portfolio that had been discounted from its 
aggregate par value of approximately $39.3 billion. Id. AIG made an equity contribution of $5 bil-
lion. Id. Doing this made the Fed’s interests senior and established that AIG would bear the first $5 
billion of loss. Id. 
 357. See supra notes 353–56. 
 358. See Press Release, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., supra note 223 (providing that all value re-
maining in Maiden Lane after payment of all debts, fees, hedges, and costs is paid to the New York 
Fed). 
 359. Id. 
 360. See id. 
 361. See AIG CDO, supra note 355. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 251 (2009). 
 364. See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text. 
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market condition.365 Congress also gave the Fed specific discretion to 
decide what would qualify as commercial paper, a power that the Fed 
used to first narrow and then broaden its rediscounting authority.366 Also, 
the Act’s incidental powers gave the Fed supplemental authority to trade, 
a point conceded in a report by a congressional oversight panel that was 
generally critical of the federal government’s handling of the financial 
crisis.367 
As the money market expanded, so too did the Fed’s authorities and 
trading operations. On its own, the Fed resolved controversial questions 
about whether it had authority to trade foreign exchange,368 reverse re-
purchase agreements,369 and do central bank swaps370 in favor of broad-
ening its trading activities. Moving in tandem, Congress had institution-
alized open market operations by statute371 and had also increased the 
Fed’s authorities by letting it trade bankers’ acceptances to promote for-
eign trade,372 foreign public debt,373 and federal agency securities.374 
The trend towards an elastic interpretation of the Fed’s trading au-
thority is clearest in terms of the Depression-era reforms relaxing collat-
eral requirements for rediscounting, authorizing working capital loans, 
and permitting stabilizing credit in unusual and exigent circumstances 
under section 13(3).375 Since granting the Fed this emergency authority 
during the Depression, Congress has consistently extended it by widen-
ing the kinds of deals that could qualify.376 Critical to the Fed’s freedom 
of action in 2008, Congress in 1991 gave the Fed authority to discount 
the kinds of debt instruments from nonbank counterparties that would 
become relevant in 2008.377 These developments rejected a crabbed un-
                                                     
 365. Indeed, Perry Mehrling suggests that the dealer-of-last-resort function was already implic-
it in the Fed’s mission, but that the growth of federal debt through World War II obliged the Fed to 
focus on providing liquidity to markets for government debt rather than other securities. MEHRLING, 
supra note 5, at 36–37. So the arc of the Fed’s development as a market maker might have been 
otherwise, leading to the same point earlier in its development. 
 366. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 367. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 237, at 64–65 (“Thus, the incidental powers provi-
sion could supplement the authority granted in Section 13(3), but it would not give the Federal Re-
serve banks authority to take actions that were specifically prohibited by the Federal Reserve Act 
(Section 13(3) or otherwise).”). 
 368. See supra notes 134–38 and accompanying text. 
 369. See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text. 
 370. See supra note 346 and accompanying text. 
 371. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 372. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 373. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 374. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 375. See supra at note 108 and accompanying text. 
 376. See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text. 
 377. See id. 
2013] Financial Hospitals: Defending the Fed 785 
derstanding of the Fed’s emergency-liquidity powers.378 Instead, they 
reflect the notion that the Fed has enhanced financial stability through 
active credit trading, not in spite of it. 
It may go too far to conclude that the Fed can “lend or repo against 
any collateral, including dead dogs and illiquid CDOs backed by sub-
prime mortgages,” but its authority is assuredly broad and elastic enough 
to confront market structure as it mutates over time.379 Indeed, even a 
congressional oversight panel that was highly critical of the federal re-
sponse to the crisis confined its assessment of the Fed’s section 13(3) 
activities solely to consider, after-the-fact, other ways that liquidity 
might have been provided.380 
C. Financial Corporatism Versus Democracy 
These legal niceties will be small consolation to Main Street. A re-
cent letter sent by Congress’s Republican leadership to Chairman 
Bernanke during a Fed meeting about monetary policy epitomized the 
recent concerns about the Fed: “The American people have reason to be 
skeptical of the Federal Reserve vastly increasing its role in the economy 
if measurable outcomes cannot be demonstrated.”381 Newt Gingrich put it 
more bluntly: the Fed “is corrupt and it is wrong for one man to have that 
kind of secret power.”382 
                                                     
 378. Lender of More Than Last Resort: Recalling Section 13(b) and the Years When the Fed-
eral Reserve Opened Its Discount Window to Business, THE REGION, FED. RES. BANK OF 
MINNEAPOLIS (David Fettig ed., 2002), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/02-
12/lender.pdf (examining history of Fed’s industrial and stabilizing programs); see also The History 
of a Powerful Paragraph: Section 13(3) Enacted Fed Business Loans 76 Years Ago, THE REGION, 
FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (David Fettig ed., 2008), available at http://www.minneapolis 
fed.org/pubs/region/08-06/section13.pdf (reviewing legislative background of section 13(3)). 
 379. Buiter & Sibert, supra note 5. This is a humorous way to point out that before the finan-
cial crisis Congress had steadily expanded the kind of collateral that the Fed could lend against. See 
supra notes 147–52 and accompanying text. A repurchase agreement (repo) is, essentially, a collat-
eralized loan formalized as two sequential purchase and sale agreements. In step one, the lender buys 
a security and promises to reconvey it to the original seller, who is also the borrower of the cash. The 
second purchase price reflects the interest paid on the cash loan. Mark C. Faulkner, An Introduction 
to Securities Lending, in SECURITIES FINANCE: SECURITIES LENDING AND REPURCHASE 
AGREEMENTS 3, 10–12 (Frank J. Fabozzi & Steven V. Mann, eds., 2005). The repurchase market 
played a key role in the last financial crisis. 
 380. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 237, at 79–84. 
 381. Letter from Sen. Mitch McConnell, Rep. John Boehner, Sen. Jon Kyl, and Rep. Eric Can-
tor to Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve (Sept. 2011), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/econ 
omics/2011/09/20/full-text-republicans-letter-to-bernanke-questioning-more-fed-action (urging the 
Fed to desist from further efforts to stimulate the economy). 
 382. John M. Berry, GOP War on the Fed Puts Bernanke on Defensive, FISCAL TIMES, Oct. 
18, 2012 (reviewing GOP presidential debates). 
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Seeing this as the GOP’s “war on the Fed,” however, misses the 
main point.383 There is an uneasy tension between the Fed’s freedom of 
action and democratic values that goes beyond partisan politics.384 The 
Fed’s recurrent wrangling with congressmen from both sides of the aisle 
suggests as much.385 The Fed’s rescue of the financial sector intensified 
this pre-existing tension, producing richly bipartisan hostility that is of 
note in an age of polarization. Doves have also pecked at the Fed for not 
doing more to stimulate the economy.386 They say that the Fed has not 
done enough for workers.387 Some even suggest that the Fed should have 
made markets for riskier forms of structured finance.388 
The claim made by critics of the Fed is pitched in terms that trans-
cend partisan difference, appealing to the suggestion of making the Fed 
more accountable to political interests.389 To that end, the proposed rem-
                                                     
 383. Berry, supra note 382. Republican Congressmen have also recommended that the Fed’s 
mandate be narrowed to focus only on inflation. Kevin Wack, Paul White House Bid Influencing 
Monetary Debate, AM. BANKER, Mar. 20, 2012, at 4 (showing how Ron Paul’s campaign against the 
Fed had mobilized criticisms of it from other Republicans). 
 384. That said, the Republican Party has radicalized the issue, another example of the “asym-
metrical polarization” of the Congress. A former American Enterprise Institute analyst and a liberal 
wrote a book that rejects the idea that both sides of the aisle have become radicalized in the same 
way. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012). 
As an act of escalation, in the middle of a September 2011 meeting of the FOMC, Republican lead-
ership sent the Chairman a letter opposing any further efforts to stimulate the economy through 
quantitative easing. Merrill Goozner, The GOP’s Startling Bid to Strong-Arm the Fed, FISCAL 
TIMES (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/09/ 21/The-GOPs-Startling-
Bid-to-Strong-arm-the-Fed.aspx#page1. 
 385. In the 1950s, Texas Democratic Representative Wright Patman began peppering the Fed 
with information requests. TODD, supra note 66, at 35. A decade later, Representative Reuss sought 
to influence monetary policy by statute. Id. at 46. In the 1980s, Senator John Melcher unsuccessfully 
tried to increase congressional control in a district court suit, Representative Henry Gonzalez (anoth-
er Texas Democrat) pursued the Fed as chair of the House Banking Committee, and Representative 
Lee Hamilton sought to put the Secretary of the Treasury back on the Fed board. Id. at 47–49. In the 
1990s, Senator Sarbane tried to keep reserve bank presidents from voting on the FOMC. Id. at 49. 
 386. A good example is the proposed National Emergency Employment Defense Act, intro-
duced by Congressman Dennis J. Kucinich of Ohio. See H.R. 2990, 112th Cong. (2011). Its heart-
breaking findings document the human cost of the financial crisis and the recession in the United 
States: nearly 14,000,000 unemployed; another 12,000,000 underemployed; over 43,000,000 below 
the poverty line; 2,000,000 foreclosures since the crisis started; and a record 1,500,000 personal 
bankruptcies. Id. § 2(a)(1)–(4). The bill puts the blame on the Fed and its management of our mone-
tary system. Id. at § 2(a)(12), (18)–(24). 
 387. Paul Krugman, Earth to Ben Bernanke, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2012, at 18 (“[W]hile the 
Fed went to great lengths to rescue the financial system, it has done far less to rescue workers.”); 
Lowenstein, supra note 17, at 52. 
 388. Buiter, supra note 342 (suggesting that this would have meant that the “liquidity crunch 
would have been tackled right at the point where it hurt”). 
 389. Levitin, supra note 4, at 438, 450 (“[T]he best that can be done is to try to maximize the 
political accountability of systemic risk policy. This means placing policy decisions in the hands of 
more, rather than less, politically accountable entities.”). Separately, he notes that “[p]rocedures can 
thus substitute for legitimacy.” Id. at 449. The insulation of the central bank from political influence 
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edies for the Fed’s perceived accountability deficit tend to involve more 
oversight by Congress. Although the Senate has routinely confirmed pre-
vious sitting chairmen of the Fed, during Chairman Bernanke’s nomina-
tion in 2009 some in Congress tried to make increased auditing of the 
Fed a precondition for his reconfirmation.390 Several recent bills have 
proposed new oversight requirements on the Fed.391 Independent Senator 
Bernie Sanders recently formed an advisory panel to consider legislative 
reforms to the Fed.392 
The notion of an accountability deficit often rests on a misconcep-
tion about the budgetary nature of the Fed’s actions. The mistaken prem-
ise is that the Fed’s actions involve budget outlays akin to congressional 
spending, which do ordinarily involve a great deal of transparency and 
oversight.393 In this view, “a Fed promise is ultimately a Treasury prom-
ise that carries the full faith and credit of the United States.”394 That is 
misleading because of an important difference between congressional 
outlays and the Fed’s trading that may not fit readily into a soundbite. 
Much congressional spending is unrequited in the sense that it does not 
generate an ongoing asset with market value. In contrast, the Fed cannot 
lend without collateral, and it must purchase for value, hence it always 
generates an asset to offset a new liability.395 Nevertheless, this miscon-
ception became so influential in the campaign against the Fed that 
Chairman Bernanke felt compelled to send Congress a clarification about 
how the economics of its emergency-liquidity programs really worked.396 
Moreover, the notion that the Fed faces an accountability deficit ig-
nores the intended antidemocratic nature of its mission. The Fed leans 
                                                                                                   
is one such mechanism that, by analogy to a procedure, is intended to substitute for the need to ap-
peal to notions of legitimacy. 
 390. Sudeep Reddy, Bernanke Foes Seek to Curtail Fed, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2009, at A4. 
 391. Johnson, supra note 1, app. A. 
 392. Press Release, Sen. Bernie Sanders, Top Economists to Advise Sanders on Fed Reform 
(Oct. 20, 2011), available at http://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/news/?id=DE4C73FB-131C-
4A25-B83E-4604EAEFCEBB. 
 393. Scott Fullwiler & Randall Wray, It’s Time to Rein in the Fed, in LEVY ECONOMICS 
INSTITUTE OF BARD COLLEGE PUBLIC POLICY BRIEF #117, 12 (2011) (“[T]hose in charge of mone-
tary policy are not subject to the same degree of democratic accountability [as other branches of 
government].”), available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/ppb_117.pdf. 
 394. Id. at 13–14. 
 395. See G. THOMAS WOODWARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. 96-672E, MONEY AND THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: MYTH AND REALITY 9 (1996) (“To inject money into the economy, the 
Fed buys federal securities, thereby acquiring an asset that pays interest. In the second round of 
money creation, banks, S&Ls, and credit unions, through the fractional reserve banking system, earn 
interest on the loans they hold as a consequence of creating checking account money. This means 
that for every dollar of money, there is a corresponding dollar of interest-bearing debt.”). 
 396. Letter from Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res., to Reps. Spencer Bachus and Barney 
Frank (Dec. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Ben Bernanke], available at http://www.federalre 
serve.gov/generalinfo/foia/emergency-lending-financial-crisis-20111206.pdf. 
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against both business and electoral cycles, so some ensuing objections 
from Main Street and its purported representatives should be understood 
as foreseeable resistance to an antimajoritarian mandate. Besides, the Fed 
already faces formal and informal political controls. It is democratically 
elected presidents and senators who pick the members of the Fed board, 
who serve fourteen-year terms. The chairman and the vice chairman of 
the Fed must be appointed by the President and confirmed by Congress 
every four years.397 
Moreover, formal attempts to insulate the Fed from political pres-
sure do not always work. The voting behavior of FOMC members sug-
gests that the “ongoing politicization of monetary policy” crosses party 
lines, suggesting a structural reality of the Fed.398 Fed Governors reflect 
partisan preferences in their decisions, with governors appointed by a 
Democratic president tending to favor loosening more often than those 
appointed by a Republican president.399 In election years, appointees of 
the incumbent party tend to favor stimulus, while those of the other party 
prefer tightening that may detract from the presidential incumbent’s per-
ceived success in managing the economy.400 Chairmen seeking reap-
pointment by a president are sometimes perceived as unduly responsive 
to the money supply preferences of a sitting president, especially one 
who is facing his own reelection.401 In general, research suggests that 
politically appointed Fed Governors may tend to favor loose money more 
so than presidents of the reserve banks, whose hawkishness might reflect 
banks’ aversion to inflation that would threaten their fixed-rate liabili-
ties.402 So political accountability is already an important part of Fed 
governance both formally and informally. 
Less, rather than more, political control is needed if you oppose at-
tempts by Congress to raid the Fed to help constituents.403 Suggesting the 
deliberative limits of a town hall meeting, the 2011 Republican presiden-
tial debates produced regrettable exchanges on central bank policy.404 
                                                     
 397. 12 U.S.C. § 242. 
 398. TODD, supra note 84, at 61–62 (discussing Thomas Havrilesky’s research on political 
orientation of Fed vice chairmen from 1976 to 1993). 
 399. Id. at 14. 
 400. Id. 
 401. Id. at 18–19; see also id. at 55 (“Although the markets, and certainly the administration, 
welcomed the dramatic Fed action, others believed that the central bank had relented in the face of 
political pressure.”). 
 402. Id. at 14. 
 403. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 227–28 (discussing Fed’s resistance to Congressional ef-
forts to allocate credit to small business). 
 404. Texas Governor Rick Perry admonished Chairman Bernanke: “If this guy prints more 
money between now and the election, I dunno what y’all would do to him in Iowa, but we would 
treat him pretty ugly down in Texas.” Lowenstein, supra note 17, at 50; see also Merrill Goozner, 
Romney Says It’s Time to Stand up to China, FISCAL TIMES (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.thefiscal 
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The exchange suggests the perils of further politicizing monetary policy 
for electoral gain.405 Recall also that it was Congress that approved the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program, a bailout program for banks adminis-
tered by the Treasury.406 So maybe the political branches should look in 
the mirror before pointing the finger at the Fed. 
Another expression of the Fed’s alleged accountability deficit re-
lates to whether it has disclosed enough about its activities.407 Bloomberg 
and Fox News sued the Fed under the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) to get more information about its financial-rescue activities.408 
Although the Reserve banks were not found to be subject to FOIA, the 
Fed did have to turn over some data that had been asserted to be privi-
leged.409 Already the Fed discloses much information, including its fi-
nancial operations through a weekly (unaudited) statement of financial 
condition.410 The Fed follows its own comprehensive accounting manual, 
which is on its website.411 It also publishes an audited annual report.412 In 
response to criticisms, the Fed has also begun to reveal much more about 
                                                                                                   
times.com/Articles/2011/10/11/Romney-Says-Its-Time-to-Stand-Up-to-China.aspx (noting Republi-
can candidates’ calls for Chairman Bernanke to be removed); Wack, supra note 383, at 4 (showing 
how Ron Paul’s campaign against the Fed had mobilized criticisms of it from other Republicans). 
 405. Berry, supra note 382. The 2011 debt ceiling crisis also suggests that elected representa-
tives may not always act prudently. Jose Gabilondo, Libertarian Fanaticism and the Debt Limit, 
MIAMI HERALD, July 30, 2011 (noting that legislative antics led a downgrade of U.S. credit rating). 
 406. The deception is that the program financed the purchase not of asset claims but of finan-
cial claims on the right-hand side of the balance sheet such as preferred stock. 
 407. Ironically, it was the Fed’s effectiveness in stabilizing financial markets in the face of 
Congress’s slapstick efforts that would attract hostile attention. Previously, Congress may not have 
understood what the Fed does: 
The Fed’s aggressive response to the Great Panic had called unwelcome attention to its 
enormous power and to its capacity to act as the fourth branch of government. Its will-
ingness to come up with money for Bear Stearns and AIG when the Treasury and the 
president couldn’t and its ability to create trillions of dollars in credit surprised many 
members of Congress. The Fed, it was increasingly clear, could and would act when the 
political system was frozen. 
WESSEL, supra note 47, at 269. 
 408. Kara Karlson, Checks and Balances: Using the Freedom of Information Act to Evaluate 
the Federal Reserve Banks, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 213, 216 (2010) (arguing that FOIA should apply 
more broadly to the federal reserve banks in addition to the board). 
 409. Id. at 213, 217. 
 410. See H.4.1 Factors Affecting Reserve Balances, FED. RES. (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.fed 
eralreserve.gov/releases/h41/20121115/. 
 411. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING MANUAL 
FOR FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS (2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/BST 
finaccountingmanual.pdf. 
 412. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, 98TH ANNUAL REPORT, (2011), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/annual%2Dreport/files/2011-annual-report. 
pdf. 
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its monetary policy deliberations.413 The reserve banks have also volun-
tarily elected to comply with the rigorous internal control system man-
dated for private firms by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act.414 
The clamoring for more democratic control may also reflect suspi-
cion about a problem too structural to be solved by disclosure—
regulatory capture by private financial interests. Indeed, some even see 
the Fed’s independence as an expression of capture by private interests, 
one that would justify more public control.415 Here is the nub of the 
deeper conflict.416 
This conflict is best understood through the lens of corporatism, 
which explains—although it may not justify—the Fed’s financial entan-
glement with banks and other lenders.417 Corporatism refers to attempts 
to blend public and private interests in social mechanisms that serve pol-
icy goals or provide a public service.418 The notion of corporatism is not 
                                                     
 413. Randall W. Forsyth, Preoccupied by Wall Street, BARRON’S, (Oct. 15, 2011), 
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052748703492704576622992970964046.html (charac-
terizing Bernanke’s approach to public disclosure as a “complete turnaround from the Fed’s ancien 
régime, which revealed next to nothing about what it was doing or thinking”). 
 414. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-11-696, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: OPPORTUNITIES 
EXIST TO STRENGTHEN POLICIES AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE 41 
(2011) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM]. 
 415. Timothy A. Canova, The Federal Reserve That We Need, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 7, 2010), 
http://prospect.org/article/federal-reserve-we-need (“Today’s fiscal conservatives prefer to ignore the 
history of the 1940s, a period when the Federal Reserve was far more accountable to elected officials 
and far more independent of the private financial interests that have come to dominate the Fed in 
recent decades.”); Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: 
From Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L. POL’Y REV. 369, 
388–393 (2009) (criticizing the “bastard[ization]” of Keynesian macroeconomic principles in the 
financial rescues by the Treasury and the Fed). 
 416. Canova criticizes what he sees as the legal academy’s general complicity in legitimating 
private capture of the Fed. Canova, supra note 415, at 392. His charges against liberals apply to me: 
“Conservative scholars rail against unconstitutional delegations but then ignore the most flagrant 
example of the Federal Reserve. Liberal scholars who purportedly care about a progressive social 
agenda defer to dogmatic law and economics assumptions about the wisdom of central bank inde-
pendence.” Id. 
 417. Corporatism refers to “a system of social and political organization in which major socie-
tal groups or interests (labor, business, military, ethnic, clan or patronage groups, religious bodies) 
are integrated into the governmental system, often on a monopolistic basis or under state guidance, 
tutelage and control, to achieve coordinate national development.” WIARDA, supra note 23. 
 418. Wiarda identifies three defining elements: (1) a unit of analysis organized around a collec-
tive formation; (2) state control over the group; and (3) incorporation of the group into a mutually 
beneficial relationship of shared governance. Id. at 9. This third element applies most clearly to the 
Fed’s relationship to banks: 
The state tries to incorporate these groups into the state system, converting them into 
what are often called “private-sector governments”; while the groups themselves seek 
both to take advantage in terms of programs and benefits for their members from such in-
corporation, and at the same time preserving some, usually contractually defined (as in a 
constitution or basic law) autonomy or independence from the state. 
Id. 
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used widely in the United States, in part because of its foreign associa-
tions and the sense that it may seem inconsistent with our ideology of 
individualistic freedom.419 It is, however, a way to explain earlier indus-
trial policies that promoted bonds between the state and private institu-
tions, bonds that mitigated what might otherwise have been overweening 
market power.420 Such arrangements may have provided a measure of 
economic security, as during the post-War period of prosperity.421 Even 
analytical approaches that emphasize corporatism in the United States in 
other industrial sectors tend to overlook the fact that the notion would 
help to explain financial regulation.422 I suggest the notion of “financial 
corporatism” to refer to the Fed’s relationship to banks because it helps 
to understand why the Fed’s structure blends both private and public fea-
tures.423 
For example, an important way that the Act promotes corporatism 
is through the Fed’s capital structure, which blends public and private 
elements. It is the private member banks that own the Federal Reserve 
                                                     
 419. Corporatism is sometimes associated with fascist and authoritarian regimes. Id. at 12. 
Wiarda gives as examples Italy under Benito Mussolini, Germany under Adolph Hitler, Spain under 
Francisco Franco, and Portugal under António de Oliveira Salazar. Id. He provides other examples 
involving France, Greece, Austria, Brazil, and Argentina. Id. at 20. Corporatism studies have en-
joyed a resurgence in European and Latin American scholarship, but less so to explain social struc-
ture in the United States. Id. at 128 (“[C]orporatism does not fit our ethos, our historic and familiar 
image of ourselves.”). 
 420. This is the idea behind John Kenneth Galbraith’s idea of “countervailing power” as a 
check on market power. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF 
COUNTERVAILING POWER 8 (1952) (noting both conservative and liberal anxiety about unrestrained 
big business). 
 421. Reich posits that during the period from 1945 to 1970, the interests of democracy and 
capitalists were relatively aligned such that firms made money, employees enjoyed income security, 
and a relatively prosperous middle class developed. ROBERT B. REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS, DEMOCRACY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 41–42 (2007) (“By fits and 
starts, the federal government had created new centers of economic power that offset the power of 
the giant companies.”); see also id. at 15–49. During this period, the chief executive officer may 
have seen himself more as a steward of corporation for the benefit of a wide variety of private and 
public concerns. Id. at 45. Now, however, job security for corporate officers depends more on quar-
terly earnings reports in labile financial markets, which also give shareholders other investment 
options. Id. at 75–76 (citing correlation between CEO dismissals and recent market downgrades of 
their firm as an investment). 
 422. WIARDA, supra note 23, at 147 (“A U.S.-style corporate state has arrived unsung, unher-
alded, and almost never mentioned. The emergence of corporatism has to do with the parallel emer-
gence of Big Labor, Big Agriculture, Big Business, Big Universities, Big Defense, Big Welfare, and 
Big Government, all operating in a symbiotic relationship.”). 
 423. In a different context, Martin Lipton has used the phrase “finance corporatism” to refer to 
a corporation’s relationships to its diverse constituencies. Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in 
the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987). 
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banks.424 Specifically, Fed member banks must subscribe 6% of their 
equity capital and surplus, half of which must be paid into the Fed.425 
Half of the subscribed capital is paid in and the other half is subject to 
call by the Fed.426 After covering its operational costs, the Fed pays its 
commercial bank members a 6% dividend on their preferred stock. The 
Fed does not pay an income tax, but the statutory dividend is counted as 
part of the gross income of the private member banks.427 Although share 
ownership suggests that private banks are the residual beneficiaries, that 
is not the case here because the share structure is more like a licensing 
requirement, a hallmark of corporatism.428 Unlike ordinary shares, stock 
in the Fed banks does not bring the right to net profits. In fact, the Fed is 
a money machine for taxpayers because it returns all profits to the Treas-
ury’s general fund, which is a financial proxy for the taxpayer.429 
Another corporatist feature of the Act is its requirement that private 
bank directors participate on Reserve boards, a rule that—as Chairman 
Bernanke recently pointed out in hearings—Congress is free to 
change.430 The rationale for the requirements is that industry insiders 
contribute knowledge that is hard to come by otherwise.431 Admittedly, 
this arrangement promotes personal relationships between the regulator 
and the regulated that create the appearance, if not the fact, of affinity 
that may be inconsistent with the public interest.432 Moreover, the Fed’s 
                                                     
 424. The Fed has a highly idiosyncratic capital structure, reflecting its blend of public and 
private interests. The Act required every national bank to buy preferred stock issued by the Fed. 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 2, 38 Stat. 251, 251 (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 282). 
 425. 12 U.S.C. § 209.4. Banks must also adjust their substantial capital as their own capital 
position changes. 
 426. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-939, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: THE SURPLUS 
ACCOUNT 2 (2002). 
 427. See WOODWARD, supra note 395 (refuting myth that the Fed dividend to banks is tax-
free). 
 428. WIARDA, supra note 23, at 15 (“Whenever we see government control, structuring, or 
licensing of interest groups, we said, we are likely to find corporatism present.”). 
 429. The money that the Treasury receives from the Fed, which is settled through a ledger 
transfer, does not disappear from the economy; it is recirculated into the economy when the Treasury 
makes a loan or purchases goods or services. 12 U.S.C. § 290 (2006); see also WOODWARD, supra 
note 395, at 26. 
 430. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 4, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended 
12 U.S.C. § 304). 
 431. Donna Borak, Dimon’s N.Y. Fed Role Reignites Old Debate, AM. BANKER, May 21, 2012, 
at 1 (discussing charges that having J.P. Morgan chief Jaime Dimon on the board of the New York 
Federal Reserve Bank was a conflict of interest); Donna Borak, Fed Official Rejects Plan to Take 
Bankers’ Seats Away, AM. BANKER, May 29, 2012, at 2 (noting that bankers can enhance the Fed’s 
function through their industry knowledge). 
 432. For that reason, mechanisms have been proposed to build in better representation of pub-
lic interests beyond the banking industry. Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Adaptation and 
Resiliency in Legal Systems: Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1642–43 (2011) (pro-
posing the creation of a “regulatory contrarian” mechanism to make financial regulators more re-
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idiosyncratic structure may make it harder to assign responsibility for 
decisions.433 
That said, there has been a remarkable absence of scandal or ethical 
lapse on the part of Fed officials and staff.434 All of the emergency-
lending programs undertaken by the Fed were independently examined 
by an external auditor.435 Unlike the political branches, whose members 
have often been found to have breached ethical and sometimes legal 
standards in the conduct of their public offices, there is no such scandal 
in recent history involving a Fed official. The absence of scandals is tell-
ing, reflecting a culture of self-regulation and self-restraint, made all the 
more extraordinary because the Fed is literally in the money business.436 
Central to corporatism is the idea that the public sector gets some-
thing out of the arrangement.437 Strictly speaking, the Fed’s annual divi-
                                                                                                   
sponsive to a wider range of interests); Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: 
Toward Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621 (2012) (suggesting the 
creation of a “Public Interest Council” to address systemic risk mandate of financial agencies). 
 433. Seen this way, the institutional features that give the system discretion can also be used 
for ill: 
It is difficult to settle responsibility for a given action on any single individual or group 
among the various groups to whom the prerogatives of power have been giv-
en….considering the extent of its influence on events and the cataclysmic nature of the 
events it survived, the truly astonishing aspect of its history has been its ability to evade 
responsibility. 
1 D’ARISTA , supra note 111, at 193–94. 
 434. The tacit involvement of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the emerging scandal 
about fixing the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate may be an unfortunate and exceptional counterexam-
ple of this. Michael J. de la Merced and Ben Protess, New York Fed Knew of False Barclays Reports 
on Rates, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2012, at A1 (noting that Fed officials had concerns about the integri-
ty of the LIBOR); Peter Evans, U.K. Orders Review of Libor, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2012, at C3. The 
LIBOR is a widely used floating rate set by a panel of bankers under the aegis of the British Bank-
ers’ Association. 
 435. FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 414, at 131. 
 436. A General Accounting Office report on governance of the reserve banks made only the 
mild observation that they would benefit from a more standardized approach to waivers of a Fed 
director from ethics or conflicts rules related to that director’s participation in reserve bank matters. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-12-18, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK GOVERNANCE: OPPORTUNITIES 
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dend is one form of public return, but the social interest in question is a 
more fundamental one—promoting a robust credit market. Specifically, a 
major social interest involves one of the central functions of a bank: to 
borrow money at short terms and to lend it at longer terms, often at the 
fixed rates that businesses and retail borrowers prefer.438 Part of what 
happened during the last crisis is that the Fed realized that term conver-
sion (essentially the formula of borrowing short to lend long) was being 
done not only by banks but also by a variety of new creatures from the 
shadow-banking sector, including asset-backed commercial paper con-
duits, securities lenders, and other credit intermediaries that were doing 
the work of banks.439 When these new credit intermediaries started suf-
fering from the liquidity crises typical of banks, the Fed treated them like 
constructive banks, deserving of liquidity support albeit tailored to reflect 
the impact of structured finance.440 
It may be time to reconsider the social pact behind term conversion 
because the last financial crisis showed that the old formula for term 
conversion had changed. A lingering and crucial question is why 
banks—more liquid than ever—have still not resumed substantial lend-
ing.441 What the Fed did was to make several important decisions during 
a financial emergency with very incomplete information. By contributing 
to a new understanding of the credit market, the Fed’s actions—and the 
crisis as a whole—are leading to a new paradigm about regulation of the 
credit market. Yesterday’s pragmatic solutions to emergencies by the Fed 
may not be perfect when judged by tomorrow’s regulatory notions. And 
Congress is free to amend the Act if it concludes that corporatism no 
longer makes sense for the financial sector. In the meantime, though, the 
Fed’s emergency-liquidity efforts will have provided invaluable insights 
for economic theory, trading policy, and regulation. 
V. DODD–FRANK 
An unusual troika recently defended the Fed from further political 
oversight. The dean of the Columbia Business School, the head of the 
Brookings Institute, and a prominent Harvard Law School professor not-
                                                                                                   
May 23, 2012, at B4 (noting China’s recent decision to bid directly rather than through a primary 
dealer). 
 438. This is one of the defining functions of a bank. Gabilondo, supra note 22, at 265 & n.38. 
 439. POZSAR ET AL., supra note 21, at 1 (“Over the past decade, the shadow banking system 
provided sources of funding for credit by converting opaque, risky, long-term assets into money-like, 
short-term liabilities.”). 
 440. Id. at 24 (“The Federal Reserve’s 13(3) emergency lending facilities that followed in the 
wake of Lehman’s bankruptcy amount to a backstop of all the functional steps involved in the shad-
ow credit intermediation process.”). 
 441. My next piece on the financial structure of the Fed addresses this issue. 
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ed that “Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke saved the U.S. financial system 
from Armageddon in 2007–08” and that indulging congressional resent-
ment at the Fed’s independence was “trouble.”442 Congress thought oth-
erwise, reducing the Fed’s freedom of action by requiring in the Dodd–
Frank Act that the Fed now get the approval of the Secretary of the 
Treasury for future emergency lending under section 13(3).443 
Nothing is gained and much is lost by increasing the political pres-
sures on the Fed’s discretion in providing emergency liquidity, effective-
ly returning part of the Fed’s role to its pre-Accord position of submis-
sion to the Treasury. By suggesting that more political oversight of the 
Fed might have helped, Congress and the Treasury are really engaging in 
projective denial because it was the political branches, not the Fed, that 
were responsible for the major bailouts, including the Troubled Assets 
Relief Program. So the Fed is taking a hit for actions of the political 
branches, who in this way also gain an alibi. 
Consider the long history of executive grasping at the Fed. Presi-
dents have routinely tried to use it to promote partisan and electoral 
goals.444 Even though the formal independence of the Fed is supposed to 
insulate its decisions from partisan influence, research shows that party 
affiliation of the Board Governors may influence voting behavior.445 This 
new requirement in Dodd–Frank extends the formal and informal politi-
cal influence that presidents have on the Fed. This also risks that subse-
quent administrations will repudiate as “political” the stabilization efforts 
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begun during a previous administration. This approval process allows the 
secretary to take fiscal concerns into account when deliberating about 
proposed emergency-liquidity programs. 
Tying the Fed’s hands this way also risks undermining the effec-
tiveness of stabilization programs because time will typically be of the 
essence in responding to financial emergencies.446 For example, the 
Fed’s decision to support Bear was made between 4:45 a.m. and 7:00 
a.m. on Friday, March 14, 2008.447 Had these Dodd–Frank provisions 
been in effect in 2008, mobilizing the decision-making apparatus of a 
political branch may have made the process less nimble. 
This restriction on the Fed’s freedom of action is also inconsistent 
with how the institution has managed its own policy making. When the 
FOMC issues a directive indicating future interest rate adjustments in a 
definite direction—towards either loosening or tightening—some at the 
Fed have believed that the directive gave the Chairman the ability to uni-
laterally make those changes before the next FOMC meeting.448 Known 
as an “asymmetric directive” because it indicates a likelihood of a partic-
ular policy direction, the rationale for such a policy is to increase the 
Fed’s freedom of action so as to make rate changes more effective.449 For 
example, in December 1990, with a recession looming on the horizon, 
the Fed Chairman asserted this authority to loosen the money supply 
without consulting with other members of the Fed Board.450 Some re-
straints on unilateral discretion may be in order, but limits emanating 
from Pennsylvania Avenue are most likely to serve partisan interests.451 
This exposure to political risk is magnified by a separate Dodd–
Frank provision that requires the Fed to report the establishment of any 
section 13(3) programs to Congress within one week.452 On a monthly 
basis, the Fed must also make public extensive information about any 
assets acquired through emergency-liquidity programs.453 At first blush, 
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requiring the Fed to report this information might seem justified. After 
all, a federal court did recently hold that the Fed had to turn over more 
information than it wanted.454 However, the President and Congress can 
now join political forces against the Fed. 
Forcing the Fed to make public information about emergency in-
vestments made during future stabilizations under section 13(3) may 
weaken the Fed’s hand in exacting the best price as it liquidates these 
investments. The new provisions do allow the Fed to limit the disclosure 
of some information only to Members of Congress.455 But this does not 
extend to the Fed’s own projections about what the ultimate sale value of 
these investment assets may be. Public disclosure of the Fed’s own as-
sessments might limit its ability to get the best price for future holdings. 
Though not as serious a problem as the requirement of prior approval by 
the Treasury, this disclosure rule might also limit the Fed’s market-
making ability. 
The Dodd–Frank Act also subjects any future emergency liquidity 
activities under section 13(3) to other rules, including the requirement 
that these activities be conducted through programs with general eligibil-
ity standards open to similarly situated firms.456 Had these requirements 
been in effect in 2008, they would certainly have precluded the Maiden 
Lane deals, because each one targeted a particular firm—Bear and AIG. 
Nevertheless, the requirement that emergency liquidity be provided 
through programs rather than one-off deals largely codifies into a statuto-
ry safe harbor the best practices that the Fed discovered by experiment-
ing with its financial hospitals. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
During its first hundred years, the Fed had cultivated discount win-
dow practices, a bank reserve mechanism, and open markets for its poli-
cy trading that were a model of central banking and the envy of financial 
capitalism. When lenders stopped being able to refinance their short-term 
loans in 2007 in the interbank market, the Fed updated Bagehot’s axiom 
about stabilization lending by bootstrapping itself into the role of market 
maker of last resort. Grounded in a contemporary understanding of cred-
it, these efforts worked, but they cost the Fed much of the political capi-
tal that it had garnered in its first century. As one banker put it, “without 
taking these risks the central banks [would have been] financially and 
reputationally safe, but poor servants of the public interest.”457 
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No good deed goes unpunished, though. In a recent exchange with 
Congress, Chairman Bernanke blamed many of the recent criticisms of 
the Fed on a systematic recycling of misinformation.458 Concerned that 
this might be true, this Article countered these criticisms with an account 
of market making that recognizes the need for centralized liquidity sup-
port. Given the new funding model for lenders, the Fed behaved appro-
priately, true to its authorities and its past while pointing—first tentative-
ly with one-off deals and then with assurance through systematic pro-
grams—to its future. But Congress did not entirely agree: the Dodd–
Frank Act subjected the Fed’s future initiatives to more political risk than 
is advisable by subjecting the Fed’s activities under section 13(3) to ap-
proval by the Secretary of the Treasury. This changes the rules of the 
game in ways that may portend risk to the Fed’s ability to stabilize the 
next crisis. This approval requirement should be repealed. 
You may disagree with this conclusion yet still be persuaded by the 
general method of analysis used in this Article. First, the Article estab-
lished that among public actors the Fed serves a distinctive mission by 
making markets and trading in them, this way influencing money and 
credit conditions as it was charged in its founding legislation. Second, 
the Article insisted that the Fed’s most recent emergency liquidity efforts 
must be understood in the context of the steady growth of its trading au-
thorities, both through Congress’s consistent statutory expansions and 
the Fed’s interpretation of them. Seen thus, the Fed’s emergency-lending 
authorities should be read as generative grants of authority to be un-
packed based on the shifting exigencies of a dynamic credit market. 
Path dependence being what it is, the Fed is sure to figure even 
more prominently in the next financial cycle. That will be yet another 
Fed, informed by its past selves and drawing on its new statutory regime 
for the first time. The hope of this Article is that when the next major 
assessment of that Fed’s performance begins, the debate will be predi-
cated on a market-infused reading of the Fed’s mission that grapples 
more completely with its complexity. 
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